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1. INTRODUCTION
Reinsurance1 is the process by which an insurance
company cedes2 a portion of its risk to another insurer called
a reinsurer. A ceding insurer purchases reinsurance to
increase its capacity to take on underwriting risk and to
reduce adverse or volatile financial results, such as those
caused by natural disasters or other unexpected losses.
A variety of reinsurers assume risk from ceding companies.
Many are U.S.-domiciled professional reinsurers. Others are
the reinsurance departments of primary insurers. These
companies are licensed in some or all states and are regulated
for solvency by insurance commissioners in essentially the
same fashion as other domestic licensed insurers.
A substantial portion of U.S. insurance risk, however, is
assumed by unlicensed foreign reinsurers that do not maintain
offices in the United States and that are not regulated for
solvency in any state. In 1992, over 42% of the reinsurance
ceded by U.S. insurers went to such reinsurers.' This
"Senior Vice President and Counsel for Government Relations, American Re-
Insurance Company, Princeton, New Jersey.
Black's Law Dictionary defines reinsurance as a
contract by which an insurer procures a third person to insure him
against loss or liability by reason of original insurance. A contract
that one insurer makes with another to protect the latter from a
risk already assumed. It binds the reinsurer to pay to the
reinsured the whole loss sustained in respect to the subject of the
insurance to the extent to which he is reinsured.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990). See William B. Bice,
Comment, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Terrorism: The
Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 441, 442 (1994) (defining
reinsurance). See generally John Butler, Legal Nature and 7pes of
Reinsurance, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE
COLLECTIONS AND INSOLVENCY 10, 10-12 (David M. Spector & John Millgan-
Whyte eds., 1988) (same).
2 In the reinsurance context, the term cede refers to the laying off of a
portion of the risk.
3 REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THE U.S. REINSURANCE
MARKET IN 1992: AN ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL STATEMENT DATA 5 (1994).
(41)
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represented $8.4 billion in premiums to unaffiliated foreign
reinsurers and $28.6 billion in reinsurance recoverables.4
Since these foreign reinsurers are not subject to domestic
solvency regulations, ceding insurers are prohibited from
treating reinsurance from unlicensed reinsurers as an asset or
a deduction from liability unless the obligations are adequately
collateralized.
Collateralization devices are extremely important to U.S.
creditors. If unlicensed insurers default on their obligations,
the creditor can, theoretically, collect what it is owed from
such devices and avoid pursuing assets in a foreign jurisdiction
and subjecting itself to the vagaries of a foreign bankruptcy
court. The purpose of this Article is to examine the efficacy of
collateralization devices for reinsurers that are not domiciled
or licensed in the United States.
2. REINSURANCE COLLATEiRALIZATION DEVICES
2.1. Current Law
Credit for reinsurance laws have become much more
uniform in recent years,5 largely because the NAIC Model
Law on Credit for Reinsurance8 ("Model Act") has been
included in the NAIC state accreditation program.' Given
this similarity, this Article will focus its analysis on the Model
Act.
The Model Act and its recommended regulation ("Model
Regulation")8 separate reinsurers into two basic categories:
those that are treated as licensed reinsurers and those that
are treated as unlicensed.9 The general philosophy of the
Model Act is that credit for reinsurance from licensed
reinsurers should be granted without collateral being posted
4 Id at 12.
5 Forty-five states have the NAIC Model or similar legislation, with a bill
for such pending in Michigan. 1994 MODEL REGULATION SERVICE (NAIC)
785-7 to 785-10.
6 Model Law on Credit For Reinsurance (1994) [hereinafter Model Act].
Robert M. Hall, Unfinished Business: Credit For Reinsurance, BEST'S
REV., Sept. 1991, at 75, 76 [hereinafter Unfinished Business].
8 Credit for Reinsurance Model Regulation (1991) [hereinafter Model
Regulation].
' See Model Act, supra note 6, § 1.
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by the reinsurer since the reinsurer is already regulated for
solvency in the United States. The solvency of unlicensed
foreign reinsurers cannot be determined, however, because
those entities are not subject to the scrutiny of state
regulators. A ceding insurer, therefore, will require collateral
from an unlicensed reinsurer that underwrites a risk. The
collateralization requirement reduces the primary insured's
risk vis-h-vis the reinsurer.
The issue is complicated, however, by the fact that the
Model Act treats some reinsurers as "licensed" even though
they are not licensed in any state. Section 1 of the Model Act
delineates the qualifications for determining whether a
reinsurer is treated as "licensed."" Section One includes: (1)
a reinsurer licensed in the state of domicile of the ceding
insurer; (2) a reinsurer that is licensed in at least one state
and becomes accredited (an abbreviated licensing process) in
the state of domicile of the ceding insurer; (3) a reinsurer that
is licensed in a state with a credit for reinsurance law which
is substantially similar to the law of the state of domicile of
the ceding company; and (4) a reinsurer that posts collateral
in a single trust fund for the benefit of all U.S. policyholders
and ceding insurers (a multiple- creditor collateralization
device)., A ceding company may represent reinsurance
recoverable from any of these "licensed" companies as an asset
on its financial statement. 2
Section 2 of the Model Act describes another
collateralization device for those unlicensed reinsurers who
cannot, or choose not to, qualify as licensed under Section 1.
These reinsurers are required to post a trust or a standby
letter of credit for the benefit of each ceding company (a single-
creditor collateralization device)."3 Section 2 allows a ceding
company to reduce its liabilities, as reported in its financial
statement, by the amount posted in the reinsurer's letter of
credit or trust obligation. 4 The nature and efficacy of both
single and multiple creditor collateralization devices will be
explored below.
10 Id. § I(A).
11 Id. § I(A) to (D).
12 1d. § 1.
13IC § 2.
14 Id
1995]
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2.2. Multiple-Creditor Collateral Devices
In Section 1(D) of the Model Act, three types of entities are
allowed to post a single pooled trust fund for the benefit of all
U.S. policyholders and ceding insurers. These entities consist
of an individual reinsurance company, a group of underwriters
consisting of both incorporated and unincorporated
underwriters (e.g., Lloyd's of London) and a group of
incorporated underwriters (e.g., the Institute of London
Underwriters) with an aggregate policyholders' surplus of
$10,000,000.15 This Section also requires that each entity
annually provide regulators with substantially the same
information required of licensed insurers. This disclosure on
the part of unlicensed insurers, with regard to the sufficiency
of the required trusts, serves the same function as the solvency
test required of domestic insurance companies.16 The trust
must be maintained in a "qualified financial institution,"
defined in the Model Act to include financial institutions
organized or licensed in the United States or any state thereof
granted authority to operate with fiduciary power and
regulated by federal or state authorities that have province
over banks and trust companies.
17
A single reinsurance company is required to hold in trust
a surplus of $20,000,000 in excess of the reinsurer's actual
liabilities to policyholders and ceding companies." The
$20,000,000 figure serves as a solvency margin or surplus,
such as would be required of a licensed reinsurer. It also
protects against under reserving by the ceding company. A
group consisting of both incorporated and unincorporated
underwriters must maintain a similar surplus of
$100,000,000; this amount is over and above the insurers'
several liabilities to U.S. policyholders and ceding companies
and is held jointly for the benefit of ceding insurers. 9 The
same size fund must be maintained by a group of incorporated
underwriters. 0
15 Id. § 1(D); Model Regulation, supra note 8, § 7.
16 Model Act, supra note 6, § 1(D).
17 Id. § 3(B).
' I&. § 1 (D)(1).
19 Id.
20 Id. § 1(D)(2).
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The form of the trust fund is subject to the approval of each
insurance commissioner.2" In addition, the trust must contain
a number of provisions: (1) claims may be paid out of the trust
thirty days after entry of a final order of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the United States; (2) legal title to the assets in
the trust shall be vested in the trustee for the benefit of U.S.
policyholders and ceding insurers; (3) the trust shall be subject
to examination by each insurance commissioner; (4) the trust
shall remain in effect for as long as the reinsurer or any
member of a group thereof shall have outstanding obligations
under reinsurance agreements subject to the trust; (5) no later
than February 28th of each year, the trustee shall report to
each commissioner the balance in the trust and certify that the
trust will not expire prior to the following December 31st; and
(6) no amendment to the trust shall be effective unless
approved in advance by each commissioner.22
Relatively few reinsurers have utilized this multiple-
creditor collateralization device. The most prominent are
members of Lloyd's, who use a pre-existing premium trust in
the United States for this purpose. 23 The Institute of London
Underwriters has considered creating such a trust, but has not
actually established one.
2.3. Single-Creditor Collateralization Devices
Much more common are trust funds and standby letters of
credit designed to collateralize obligations to individual
creditors.2 4 Funds must be placed in these trusts by year end
and the ceding company is allowed to reduce its balance sheet
liabilities by an amount equal to the collateralization.2 5
Stated differently, if the collateralization is less than the
recoverable from the reinsurer, the ceding company may not
reduce its liabilities by the amount of the deficiency.
The single creditor collateralization devices are much more
21 Id. § (D)(3).
22 Model Regulation, supra note 8, § 6 (c).
23 Lloyd's trust fund, established over fifty years ago, is estimated at
$9.6 billion. Meg Fletcher, U.S. Regulators Step Up Oversight of Lloyd's,
BUS. INS., Aug. 29, 1994, at 42.
24 Unfinished Business, supra note 7, at 76.
25 Model Act, supra note 6, §2.
1995]
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structured than the multiple creditor devices.26 The trust is
for the express and sole benefit of the ceding insurer, which
may withdraw assets at any time, without notice to or
approval of the reinsurer.2 The reinsurer may withdraw
assets from the trust only with the beneficiary's approval.2"
The reinsurer may, however, substitute assets upon call or
maturity and may withdraw amounts that exceed 102% of the
reinsurer's obligations to the beneficiary.2" The trust assets
must consist of: (1) cash; (2) securities listed by the Securities
Valuation Office of the NAIC and qualifying as admitted
assets; (3) a clean, irrevocable, unconditional and "evergreen"
letter of credit30 issued or confirmed by a qualified financial
institution; or (4) any other form of security acceptable to the
insurance commissioner.3 "
The Model Act and Regulation describe in great detail the
requirements that govern the form of the trust or letter of
credit. Additionally, the Model Act and Regulation delineate
the permissible uses of funds by the beneficiary as well as the
acceptable terms of the reinsurance contract clauses utilized
in conjunction with the single creditor collateralization
device.3 2 These requirements differ significantly from the
requirements for multiple-creditor collateralization devices,
and the principal differences are noted above.33
2.4 Deficiencies in Reinsurance Collateralization Devices
a. Single Creditor Collateralization Devices
Probably as a result of their highly structured nature,
single creditor collateralization devices have served their
purpose reasonably well. 4 In an insolvency context, however,
21 See id. § 2; Model Regulation, supra note 8, §§ 9 & 10.
27 Model Regulation, supra note 8, § 10.
28 Id
29 Id.
30 An "evergreen" letter of credit is one that requires the issuing financial
institution to provide at least 30 days notice prior to the expiration or non-
renewal date. Hall, supra note 7, at 76.
"1 Model Regulation, supra note 8, § 9.
32 Id. § 10.
s See infra sections 2.2.-2.3.
4 See Unfinished Business, supra note 7, at 75; Stuart Cotton, LOCs:
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a number of detailed issues continue to undergo refinement
and are the subject of litigation. For example, some reinsurers
have attempted to block ceding companies from drawing down
letters of credit or executing on collateral securing the letter
of credit within the four month voidable preference time
period."5
In Pine Top Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am.," the Seventh Circuit
held that an insurer did not create a voidable preference when
it drew down a reinsurer's line of credit during the four month
period preceding the reinsurer's insolvency." The dispute in
Pine Top arose when, in early 1986, Pine Top Ins. Co.'s ("Pine
Top") reinsurance reserves fell from $ 12.6 to $ 1.8 million.3"
As a condition of conducting any further business, Republic
Western Insurance Company ("Republic") and Century
Indemnity Company ("Century"), two of Pine Top's reinsurance
clients, required Pine Top to establish a standby letter of
credit to secure its reinsurance obligations.39 In an effort to
resuscitate Pine Top's reinsurance business, Pine Top's parent
company, acting on Pine Top's behalf, obtained a $10 million
letter of credit from the Bank of America National Trust and
Savings Association (the 'Bank"). 4
The facts of the case revealed that the bank issued the
letter of credit several weeks before it received any
collateral.4 ' The efforts to revive Pine Top were unsuccessful
and Republic and Century subsequently drew upon the full
amount of the Pine Top letters of credit.42 During the
liquidation proceedings, the trustee for Pine Top's creditors
brought a diversity action claiming that the draw downs by
Republic and Century were voidable.43 The Seventh Circuit
Not Foolproof But Still Safe, BEs's REV., Oct. 1987, at 56, 110.
" Unfinished Business, supra note 7, at 78.
36 969 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1992).
37 Id. at 325-29 (holding that the transfer of a security interest was
"substantially contemporaneous" with the creditor's letter of credit and
therefore not a voidable preference).
38 Id. at 323.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 323-34.
1995]
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held that the draw upon Pine Top's letters of credit fell
"squarely outside the justification for voiding... transfers, " 44
reasoning that the collateral offered was issued substantially
contemporaneously with the issuance of the letter of credit and
not for an antecedent debt.45 It is likely that these and other
similar issues will continue to arise concerning the uses of
single creditor trust devices. Such litigation, however, should
not undermine the basic efficacy of these devises.
Conversely, the U.S. Congress' assessment of single
creditor collateralization devices poses a much greater threat
to the validity of these devices. The U.S. Congress has been
highly critical of the collateralization practices of several
single creditor trusts.46  A House of Representatives
committee report focused on four insurance insolvencies 4 and
cited numerous instances where trust or letter of credit assets
were insufficient to pay the claims due from the reinsurer.48
Since the size of the collateralization device depends on the
losses reported by the ceding company, the failure to fully
reserve by the ceding company may have been the more
proximate cause of the problem. Once the ceding company
reported its true liabilities, the reinsurer could understandably
be skeptical about further requests for increased amounts of
44 Id at 326-29.
41 Id. at 328. A similar situation arose in In Re: The Receivership of
Southeastern Casualty and Indem. Ins. Co., No. 89-2855, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon
County 1991)., when a receiver for an illiquid reinsurance company blocked
an insurance company's complete draw down of the illiquid reinsurer's letter
of credit within the voidable preference and fraudulent conveyance periods.
Id., reprinted in 2 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS INSURANCE INSOLVENCY
No. 22, at F-1, F6 to F-8 (Apr. 17, 1991). In this case, the reinsurer, as a
condition of conducting business, was required to post a $ 1,000,000 letter
of credit in favor of the ceding insurer. Id. at F-3. In July of 1989, the
insurer made a demand on the reinsurer for the payment of three bonds,
totally $314,000. Id. at F-3 to F-4. When the reinsurer failed to make
payment on the bonds, the reinsurer attempted to draw down the entire
$1,000,000 limit. Id. at F-5. The court found in favor of the receiver,
holding that under these facts the transfer was both voidable and
fraudulent. Id. at F7 to F8.
4" FAILED PROMISES INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES: A REPORT BY
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE (Comm. Print 1990).
4 Id. at 2.
48 Id. at 60-61, 69-70.
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collateral and could be driven out of business.4 9 As a result,
the problem may be more a result of the faulty manner in
which financially troubled ceding companies calculate their
reserves than a flaw in the functioning of single creditor
collateralization devices."0
b. Multiple Creditor Devices: Lloyd's American Trust
Fund
The most prominent example of a multiple creditor
collateralization device is the Lloyd's American Trust Fund
("LAT")5 and related trusts. Given the unique nature of
these trusts and their relative importance in the field of
collateralization devices, they will be reviewed in some detail
below.
i. Liabilities Secured by the LAT
Section 1(D) of the Model Act requires that the LAT be
maintained "for the payment of the valid claims of its United
States policyholders and ceding insurers"52 equal to an
amount "representing the group's liabilities attributable to
business written in the United States""3 plus $100 million" .
Therefore, on its face, the Model Act seems to require that the
Names at Lloyd's55 ("Names") maintain, at a minimum,
amounts equal to their liabilities to U.S. policyholders and
ceding companies, plus $100 million, in the LAT."6 In reality,
however, this is not how the assets placed in the LAT are calculated.
By definition, the LAT applies to "American business," or
"' The size of the collateral is intended to match the ceding company's
liabilities. If the ceding company under-estimates or under-reports
liabilities while it is in financial difficulty, there will be insufficient
collateral to cover such liabilities. If the ceding insurer becomes insolvent
and the under-reserving is corrected, the reinsurer may be asked for more
collateral in a very short time period. This could make the reinsurer
skeptical about the veracity of the insuring company's new reserve figures.
5 See Unfinished Business, supra note 7, at 75.
5' See Appendix A.
52 Model Act, supra note 6, § 1(D).
53 Id.
"Investors in Lloyd's are referred to as "Names."
,Model Act, supra note 6, § 1(D).
1995]
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those accounts where premiums are payable, or liability is
expressed, in U.S. dollars. 7 Because this definition is
predicated on the use of U.S. currency,"8 it fails, in some
instances, to capture all the business written in the United
States, while in other instances it encompasses business not
related to the United States. Thus, the LAT definition is too
narrowly (or broadly) tailored in relation to the Model Act.
For example, the LAT definition is under-inclusive when it
fails to capture accounts written in the United States that
utilize foreign currencies. Similarly, the definition is too broad
when it regulates accounts written in U.S. currency that have
no relation to the United States.
Obvious concern arises when the LAT definition fails to
capture the full amount of American liabilities, because such
a narrow definition results in insufficient assets to
collateralize liabilities. Unnecessary breadth is problematic
because it is difficult for U.S. creditors and regulators to: (1)
understand what business is secured by the trust; (2) evaluate
the liabilities related to such business which are secured by
the trust; and (3) determine whether an adequate
correspondence exists between liabilities and the assets meant
to secure assets. If the reserves for non-U.S. business are
inadequate, claims by foreign creditors can dilute the amounts
available to U.S. creditors. United States creditors will have
to engage in a "race to the courthouse" with foreign creditors
over assets meant to collateralize U.S. obligations. United
States creditors with unliquidated or contingent claims may
find no funds remaining by the time their claims mature. The
scope of the LAT simply does not match the requirements of
the Model Act.5"
ii. Amount of the LAT Assets
The LAT is intended to secure U.S. obligations."0 To serve
its intended purpose, therefore, the trust must contain
5 See Appendix A (defining "American business").
58 See id.
5 Because of a lack of disclosure, regulators may be unable to review the
LAT to ensure that it contains the assets required by the Model Act. See
Appendix A (Art. 6(A)); See Model Act, supra note 6, § 1(D).
0 See Appendix A.
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sufficient assets to meet the amount of incurred obligations.
Section 1(D)(1) of the Model Act requires that the trust consist
of "the group's liabilities attributable to business written in
the United States . . ."' In apparent contradiction to the
Model Act, 2 the LAT assets are net of reinsurance
recoverables.6" The revelation of this fact in mid-1994 created
considerable consternation for both regulators and creditors
who previously understood the trust's value to be equal to its
gross liabilities.6 4
There are several critical problems with a trust that is net
of reinsurance recoverables. First, no assurances exist that
the reinsurance provided meets either U.S. standards for
creditworthiness or U.S. accounting standards for treatment
of reinsurance. In the past, various syndicates have used
"time and distance" reinsurance contracts which delay
61 Model Act, supra note 6, § 1(D).
62 Use of the unqualified term "liabilities" does not suggest the term
refers to liabilities minus reinsurance recoverable or any other factor. If
reinsurance recoverables are to be deducted, then there must be a review of
the credit-worthiness of the reinsurers to determine the likelihood that they
will meet their obligations. Likewise, a review of the transaction should be
conducted to assure it meets proper U.S. accounting standards for treatment
as reinsurance. Recoveries overdue or in dispute would have to be identified
and excluded from the credits. In addition, a general charge for
uncollectibility should be considered akin to the Risk Based Capital
calculations in the United States. The initial point is obvious: "liabilities"
does not mean "liabilities minus some factor that the party obligated to post
the trust chooses to use to reduce the size of the trust."
The second point is that adding factors to and subtracting factors from
"liabilities" requires the imposition of U.S. legal and accounting rules on the
transactions of the reinsurer posting the trust. The reason why the
reinsurer is posting the trust is that it does not wish to be subject to these
legal and accounting rules in the first place. Therefore, the answer to this
line of inquiry is that the reinsurer should become licensed or accredited in
the United States if it chooses not to comply with collateralization
requirements.
" Meg Fletcher, U.S. Regulators Step Up Oversight of Lloyd's, Bus.
INS., Aug. 29, 1994, 42, 43-44.
64 The NAIC Reinsurance Working Group believes that the LAT should
contain gross liabilities without netting of reinsurance recoverables. The
chair of the Working Group stated "that it had always been his
understanding that the reference (liabilities) was to the reinsurer's gross
liabilities arising from U.S. business, with no consideration ofretrocessional
arrangements.... ."NAC Proceedings, 1994 (quotation taken by author at
1994 NAIC meeting). In reaction to the revelation about the LAT, the
Working Group voted to clarify the Model Act by specifying that liabilities
should reported as a gross figure. Id.
1995]
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recognition of losses but do not transfer underwriting or other
risk.' 5
Finally, reinsurance recoverables are the underwriter's
property. If the underwriter becomes insolvent, the trustee for
the underwriter's creditor should be able to collect reinsurance
recoverables. These recoverables, however, would be available
to satisfy all of the underwriter's debts and not merely the
debts on U.S. business.6 As a result, the net LAT trust
requirements are significantly inferior to those found in the
Model Act.
iii. Auditing Net Liabilities
Unfortunately, no apparent mechanism exists to assure
that net assets in the LAT are sufficient to cover net U.S.
liabilities. Names are audited annually to determine whether
they have sufficient assets in trust to meet their world wide
liabilities.6 " There are, however, other premium trusts in
Canada and the United Kingdom. Similarly, these trust's
auditing processes do not match assets and liabilities.6 8 As a
result, a Name will pass the auditing process even if a
deficiency in the LAT exists, so long as an offsetting surplus
" The delay in recognition of losses may give a false impression of the
actual liabilities which need to be collateralized.
66 Reinsurance recoverables are pooled into one large fund to benefit all
creditors of a particular class. No distinction is made with regards to a
creditor's location. Therefore, foreign creditors have the same rights to
reinsurance recoverables as domestic creditors.
67 See Central Fund Byelaw No. 4 (1986), reprinted in 4 LILLY'S
ABRIDGMENT 11-180 to 11-181 (Sept. 10, 1992).
"8 Section 83 of the Insurance Companies Act of 1982 requires that a
trust audit disclose whether the value of trust assets are sufficient to meet
insurance and reinsurance liabilities. Insurance Companies Act of 1982, ch.
50, § 83 (Eng.). The audit requirements do not mandate that particular
trust assets be matched with liabilities. Id. The U.K. Department of Trade
and Industry ("DTI") requires that a Name maintain in trust the greater of
either a percentage of net premiums for each class of business written or a
best estimate of the syndicate's liabilities. The DTI recently increased the
minimum standard, particularly on U.S. business and this may increase the
losses to Names for the 1991 underwriting year. Stacy Shapiro, Syndicates
Balk at New Solvency Measure, Bus. INS., Mar. 7, 1994, at 51, 51-52. By
1994, over 5000 Names had inadequate funds backing their obligations.
Graeme King, Questions and Answers, THE SON, Apr. 1994, at 4. Nearly
1500 additional Names applied to Lloyd's for hardship status, while another
179 declared bankruptcy or entered a voluntary arrangements. Id.
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remains in another trust account.
While the LAT assets requirement may provide Lloyd's
with sufficient evidence of a Name's assets, the requirements
provide little assurance for U.S. creditors and regulators.
Although U.S. regulators have the authority to examine the
trust,6 9 as a matter of practice, such authority has not been
utilized2 ° Moreover, Article Six of the LAT specifically
prohibits U.S. creditors from obtaining the information
necessary to match assets in the trust with obligations owed
to those creditors. 1
If an annual audit reveals a deficiency in the LAT and the
appropriate Names decline or refuse to correct the deficiency,
the Central Fund at Lloyd's may "earmark" assets to offset the
deficiency.72 The amounts earmarked by the Central Fund
have increased significantly over the last two years.73 In
" See Model Regulation, supra note 8, § 7(c)(3).
70 In 1994, New York State's Insurance Department became the first U.S.
regulatory agency to investigate LAT. Fletcher, supra note 63, at 42.
71 See Appendix A (Art. 6(A)).
72 William Gleeson, Lloyd's Faces Up To Its £3 Billion Dilemma,
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 7, 1994, at 33.
7 At the end of 1993 the LAT's balance was £903,662,000, as compared
to a 1992 balance of £1.1 billion. ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 1993,
LLOYD'S OF LONDON 38 (1994). The amounts earmarked for the Central
Fund increased from £354,900,000 in 1992 to £661,600,000 million in 1993.
Id. at 43. The actual claims paid out to cover unfunded cash calls increased
from £44.1 million in 1992 to £312.2 million in 1993. Id. at 37. The Central
Fund had an operating deficit of £567,800,000, whereas in 1992, the fund
operated at a £219,900,000 surplus. Id. at 40.
Since the assets required by the DTI solvency test for 1992, as
calculated in August 1993, exceeded the Central Fund's assets, Lloyd's had
to utilize its corporate assets had to cover the deficit. Adrian Ladbury &
Stacy Shapiro, Lloyd's Clears Solvency Test, Now Going After Members'
Debt, BUS INS., Sept. 19, 1994, at 82. To pass the solvency test for 1993,
Lloyd's had to include the Lloyd's building as an asset and £180 million
of estimated double counting of losses. Id. Many critics have noted that the
difficulty in collecting outstanding balances from Names, when combined
with continuing losses from past years, presents a serious problem for the
Central Fund in 1995. Gleeson, supra note 72, at 33. Tae reluctance of
Names to contribute to the funds means that "earmarkint, can be expected
to exceed Central Fund and all other assets next year." Id.
Christopher Stockwell, chairman of the Lloyd's action groups, has
commented: "[1legally, Lloyd's is technically solvent now, but I don't see how
they'll get through solvency this year.... Names who are earmarked are
bust and they're not going to pay any money." Clare Sambrook, Names
Claim That Lloyd's Could Face 'Insolvency', DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 25,
1994, at 20. Mr. Stockwell went on to note that Lloyd's covered sums owed
1995]
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addition, the Central Fund supports a variety of other causes,
thereby impairing the ability of the Central Fund to meet
shortfalls in the LAT. 4  The legal implications of
"earmarking" are unclear. Earmarked funds do not necessarily
have to be set aside to meet corresponding debt obligations."
Nor does earmarking require that a contribution be made to
the LAT by the Central Fund, nor does the failure to do so
even give rise to a right of action against the Central Fund for
U.S. creditors.76 Furthermore, the Central Fund's obligation
under this debt remains entirely discretionary.7 Robert
Hiscox, Deputy Chairman of Lloyd's, confirmed that Lloyd's is
under no obligation if NewCo."8 becomes illiquid. Mr. Hiscox
has noted:
by about 7,500 members last year and this year it is likely that it will have
to stand for more than 10,000. Id.
"4 The Central Fund subsidizes Lioncover, which is a vehicle to reinsure
73 syndicates with disastrous results, primarily from long tailed casualty
business. Through the end of 1993, the Central Fund had contributed
£231,000,000 to cover deficient loss reserves with further reserve
deterioration likely. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 46. In
addition, these syndicates have £477,000,000 in questionable reinsurance
recoveries. Id.
The Central Fund also subsidizes CentreWrite which provides stop loss
reinsurance to syndicates in run-off and individual Names. Id. A
£21,200,000 subsidy was required to fund CentreWrite's deficiencies in 1993.
Id. The Central Fund provides funds for hardship arrangements for Names
in financial difficulty. Id. In addition, Central Fund was willing to
contribute a reported £400,000,000 to the unsuccessful effort to settle the
Names litigation against Names' agents and managing agents. Planning for
Profits: A Business Plan, Apr. 1993, at 38-9, 64-65 [hereinafter Business
Plan].
" Central Fund Byelaw No. 4 (1986), reprinted in 4 LILLY'S ABRIDGMENT
11-175 (Sept. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Central Fund Byelaw No. 4).
SId.
" See id. The Byelaw requires that: "Monies out of the Central Fund
may be applied and the Central Fund may be charged for any of the
following purposes: ... (d) Extinguishing or reducing the liability of any
member of the Society to any person whatsoever, whether or not arising
under a contract of insurance." Id. at 11-177 (emphasis added). This byelaw
would seem to allow use of the Central Fund to extinguish any debt of a
Name, regardless of whether or not related to insurance or reinsurance
obligations.
78 NewCo. is a central vehicle through which Lloyd's Names reinsure
prior-year losses. See Lisa S. Howard, Some Lloyd's Names Balk at Long-
Tail U.S. Claims, NAT[L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 20, 1993, at 27, 38-39
[hereinafter Howard, Names Balk].
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The Central Fund is not an automatic trigger. There's
nothing in the Lloyd's Act of 1982 that states that if one
syndicate fails, or if one member fails, another has to
step in to pay their debts... [T]he Council [of Lloyd's]
... would have to decide whether it was in the best
interests of the Society that Lloyd's continue to pay
every valid claim... [If the worst happens,] all I can
say is the American insurance industry would be
dead. 9
Presumably, other U.S. creditors would fare no better.
iv. Several Nature of LAT
Section 1 (D)(1) of the Model Act and Section 7 (B)(2) of the
Model Regulation 0 require that the LAT equal aggregate
liabilities attributable to U.S. business plus $100,000,000 held
jointly for the benefit of ceding companies. Aggregate
liabilities are much larger than $100,000,000.81 As a result,
the vast majority of the funds in the LAT are held on a several
"' Lisa S. Howard, Lloyd's Struggles To Put Value On Tail Claims, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Mar. 28, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Howard Lloyd's Struggles].
But see Lloyd's Warning, THE TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 41 (paraphrasing
comments of Peter Middleton, chief executive of Lloyd's, connecting the
failure of NewCo. with that of Lloyd's). Mr. Middleton's believes that the
Department of Trade and Industry or the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission would close Lloyd's if NewCo. failed. Id.
One author has noted:
If NewCo. goes down for the count, the new Lloyd's will not escape.
American policy-holders who remain unpaid would try to seize the
billions of dollars held on behalf of Names in Lloyd's American trust
funds. They would also seek the backing of the British courts,
adding to the vicious spiral of legal actions that has already so
damaged the market's reputation... The new Lloyd's may believe
that it is immune from the problems of the past, but it is likely to
find that the ring-fence provides at best only partial protection.
ADAM RAPHAEL, ULTIMATE RISK, THE INSIDE STORY OF THE LLOYD'S
CATASTROPHE 294 (1994) [hereinafter ULTIMATE RISK].
" See Model Act, supra note 6, § 1(D)(1); Model Regulation, supra note
8, § 7(B)(2).
" As of December 31, 1994 the LAT assets equaled $8,719,000,000.
Security Underlying Policies Issued at Lloyd's, LLOYD'S OF LONDON, June
1993. It has been reported more recently that the size of the LAT is $9.55
billion. See Meg Fletcher, Lloyd's Gets Closer Look: U.S. Policyholders,
Regulators Reassess Market Security, BUS. INS., Mar. 21, 1994, at 1.
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basis.8 2 Each Name posts funds for its own liabilities and has
no obligation for the liabilities of other Names. 3
As noted above, the LAT's aggregate value does not include
full liabilities.8 4 Moreover, the Council of Lloyd's does not
require each Name to have a net LAT assets value which
matches its U.S. liabilities."5 Historically, U.S. regulators
have failed to monitor the adequacy of the LAT funds" and
the creditors are prohibited by the LAT from obtaining the
information necessary.8 7 As a result, it is possible that an
82 Lloyd's Insurance Market: Facing the Financial Challenges of the
1990's, MOODY'S SPECIAL COMMENT, Oct. 1993, at 5-6 [hereinafter
MOODY'S].
T]here is not, for example, a single, giant Lloyd's American Trust
Fund of US $8.7 billion. Instead, there are several hundred
separate Lloyd's Trust Funds containing wholly-segregated assets,
which, as of December 31, 1992, would have totaled US $8.7 billion
if added together. . . . At the end of the three years, any
premium and investment income that has not already been used to
pay claims and claims expenses will be repatriated as a
contribution to the overall result for the syndicate's Names. U.S.
policyholders therefore need to be aware that they have recourse
only to the trust funds and Names relating to the syndicate or
syndicates that have provided them with cover. U.S. policyholders
have never had access to the global value of the whole market's
trust funds and Names as if they comprised a single, corporate
claims reserve.
83 See id. at 5.
84 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
88 See Appendix A (Art. 3).
88 See G. Larry Engel, Selected Issues for Policyholders (Including Ceding
Insurers), in Securing Meritorious Claims Being Disputed by Lloyd's or
Other Alien Insurers, SOLVENCY CONCERNS WITH FOREIGN INSURERS AND
REINSURERS/RECENT DEVELOPMENTS/U.S. REFORM EFFORTS E-10 (ABA ed.
1994) (noting that U.S. regulators do not have the resources to monitor trust
balances).
8' Article 6 of the LAT reads as follows:
Nor even after his claims becomes enforceable as herein defined,
shall any policy holder be entitled to require from the American
Trustee any account, or otherwise to inquire into the course of
administration of the trusts relating to the American Trust Fund,
or to question any act for thing done or suffered by the American
Trustee, or otherwise to enforce such trusts, the sole right under
the American Trust Deed of such policy holder being to receiver the
amount of his claims after its has become enforceable as herein
defined from the assets of the American Trust fund then actually in
the hands of the American Trustee and available for such payment
as provided in subdivision (C) of this Article.
See Appendix A (Art. 6).
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individual Name will have insufficient LAT funds to cover its
U.S. obligations. Such a scenario could occur if the Name: (1)
has posted liabilities minus reinsurance recoverables; (2)
maintains funds in another trust; (3) has become financially
impaired, insolvent or dissolves; or (4) employs reinsurance-to-
close ("RITC")88 and removes its funds from the LAT.
v. Debts Paid by the LAT
As one would expect, the assets in the LAT are designed to
pay losses, claims and return of premiums. The LAT, however,
has many other permitted uses that undermine the security of
U.S. creditors. Articles Five and Fourteen of the LAT
authorize that trust assets may be utilized for: (1) a first lien
held by the trustee for remuneration of expenses and counsel
fees; 9  (2) salary, commission, brokerage or other
remuneration due to a Name's agent or any other person; (3)
any expenses of such an agent in connection with the
underwriting business of a Name, whether a U.S. business or
not;90 (4) any expenses of an agent in connection with the
termination of the underwriting business of a Name, whether
a U.S. business or not; and (5) reinsurance premiums.91
88 RITC is a reinsurance mechanism that permits a ceding company to
lay off its excess liability to another or successor syndicate. The ceding
company lacks privity with the RITC syndicate and therefore has no legal
redress to collect any funds posted by the RITC syndicate. The original
Name, although remaining liable for the LAT deficiency, may lack the
necessary funds required for collection. See A GUIDE TO CORPORATE
MEMBERSHIP, LLOYD'S OF LONDON, 24-25 (1993) [hereinafter CORPORATE
MEMBERSHIP].
89 The trustee has a "first lien" on the assets of the trust to pay the
trustee's remuneration, expenses and counsel fees. See Appendix A (Art.
14). Because the trust's purpose is secure policyholders and ceding
companies' payments, it is inappropriate to pay other obligations out of the
trust and illegitimate to grant priority to those particular expenses vis a vis
the trust's obligation to policyholders and ceding companies. See Model
Regulation, supra note 8, §10(b)(9) (relating to single creditor trusts).
Moreover, it would seem especially inappropriate to pay the legal expenses
incurred in resisting the claims of beneficiaries of the LAT.
90 One commentator has suggested that funds could be removed from the
LAT to pay defense costs as priority expenses assessed in tort litigation
between a Name and one of its agents. See Engel, supra note 86, at E-12.
"' It has also been suggested that the LAT funds could be used to pay for
the Name's reinsurance, which would make both the reinsurance premiums
and reinsurance proceeds inaccessible to U.S. creditors. Id. at E-13.
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Those familiar with single creditor collateralization devices,
which prohibit payments for extraneous expenses, 92 may find
it alarming that the LAT permits a Name to draw on
collateralized assets for operating expenses. It is questionable
whether this device meets the letter and spirit of the Model
Act and Model Regulation." Clearly, there should be a rule
assuring regulators and creditors that sufficient assets exist to
pay trust obligations to policyholders and ceding companies.
vi. Mechanics of the LAT
The mechanics of the LAT raise further problems. For
example, Article Six of the LAT provides a mechanism for
policyholders to make a claim against trust assets, but
provides no similar remedy for ceding companies.94 While
"policyholders" may encompass both types of creditors in the
United Kingdom, this is not necessarily the case in the United
States."
Additionally, other problems arise during collection. Under
Article Six, a creditor must wait thirty days after filing a final
(i.e., after all appeals have been resolved) judgment before it
receives any amount owed from the trust. 6 During that
thirty day period, a Name is authorized, pursuant to Article
Five, to draw on some, or all, of the LAT funds.97 Thus, a
U.S. creditor could be deprived of its remedy after years of
"2 See Model Act, supra note 6, § 2; Model Regulation, supra, note 8, §§ 9,
10.
" See generally Model Act, supra note 6; Model Regulation, supra, note
8, (stating the Act and Regulation's purpose is to protect the public interest
and comply with pre-existfng laws and regulations).
g See Appendix A (Art. 6).
See e.g., In Re Liquidations of Reserve Ins. Co., 524 N.E.2d 538 (Ill.
1988). The court in Reserve held that reinsurers were not policyholders for
purposes of the priority of distribution of assets of an insolvent company's
estate. Id. at 542. Similarly, the petitioner's brief in the case of In Re
Laurencio Jaen Ocana utilized the "policyholder" argument as part of its
defense against a ceding insurer, who sought to attach assets placed in a
LAT-type trust. Reply Brief at 14, In Re Laurencio Jaen Ocana, 151 B.R.
670 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ) (No. 91-B15233) (on file with author). The court found
it unnecessary to pass on the policyholder argument. See Laurencio 151
B.R. at 673. It is undesirable to await the default of one or more syndicates
to find out whether they would make the same argument.
s See Appendix A (Art. 6).
See Appendix A (Art. 5).
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litigation.
There is nothing in the LAT that specifies the nature or
quality of the investment of the assets of the trust.9" Given
recent investment related receiverships," asset quality is an
issue of every increasing importance for regulators and
creditors. Another problem exists because, although Article
Eleven of the LAT requires the trustee to provide an account
of its actions to the Name's agent, such disclosure is
ineffectual. Approval by the Name's agent completely
discharges the trustee's obligations to any party, including the
beneficiaries of the trust. 00 Furthermore, the agent does not
assume or indemnify the trustee's liabilities, 01 but rather
nullifies the obligations. It is unclear what authority the
agent has to discharge beneficiaries' claims held against the
trustee for misconduct in handling the trust. 02
Finally, unlike the Model Act and Model Regulation,0 3 the
LAT does not grant the insurance commissioner of a respective
state the authority to examine the trust. Similarly, the LAT
does not require the trustee to make any disclosures to a
state's insurance commissioner."'
Theoretically, the gaps between the trust language and the
relevant statutes and regulations could be resolved if
regulators made use of their powers to review and approve the
terms of the trust under the Model Act.' Regulators owe
such a duty to U.S. creditors and this duty has not been
"" Section 1 of the Model Act and Section Seven of the Model Regulation
require the Name to disclose prior-year investments. Model Act, supra note
6, §1(D)(4); Model Regulation, supra note 14, §7(C)(5). The insured has
little recourse ex ante, however, to cure a past investment mishap.
"9 For example, these include Executive Life Insurance Company (junk
bonds) and Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company (real estate).
100 See Appendix A (Art. 11).
101 See Appendix A (Art. 13).
102 See, e.g., Model Regulation, supra note 8, § 10 (B)(10) (requiring that
the trustee of a single creditor collateralization device be liable for its own
negligence, willful misconduct or lack of good faith).
103 Model Act, supra note 6, §1(D); Model Regulation, supra note 8, §7(C).
Both provisions grant state insurance commissioners the authority to
examine the trust.
104 See Model Act, supra note 6, § l(D)(4) (requiring that disclosure of the
trust balance and the nature, quality, and quantity of its investments be
made by February 2 8 th of the following calendar year).
.05 Model Act, supra note 6, § l(D)(3).
1995]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
fulfilled. In a broader sense, it is clear that the LAT suffers
badly in comparison with single creditor collateralization
devices when viewed from a creditor standpoint. Some
regulators and industry commentators may be correct to
suggest that multiple creditor collateralization devices should
be eliminated, they provide poor security and are inadequate
substitutes for single creditor devices.
Alternatively, the Model Act and Model Regulation could be
amended to make multiple creditor collateralization devices
more viable. These changes, when combined with actual
enforcement of the law, would have substantial benefits for
U.S. creditors. The following subsection presents such
proposed changes to the Model Act and Model Regulation.
vii. Remedial Measures
First, the Model Act and Model Regulation should
incorporate investment guidelines that would assume that the
assets placed in trust will not become valueless. 0 6 Second,
the Model Act and Model Regulation should be amended to
limit the definition of LAT liabilities to include only
obligations to U.S. ceding companies and policyholders holding
property or risks situated in the United States. Third, every
Name should be audited annually and its U.S. liabilities and
matching assets should be disclosed. Fourth, U.S. creditors
should be authorized to obtain information regarding each
Name's obligation due to that creditor. Fifth, to further reduce
the risk that individual Names would have insufficient assets
to meet their obligations, the LAT should make each Name
jointly liable for the liabilities of all other Names.' To the
06 States typically have stringent guidelines regulating the nature,
quality and diversification of insurance companies' investment portfolio.
See, e.g., N.Y INS § 1401 (McKinney's 1994) (Definitions); N.Y. INS. § 1402
(McKinney's 1994) (investment requirements); N.Y. INS. (McKinney's 1994)
(minimum capital or surplus requirements).
107 Lloyd's representatives contend that Lloyd's operates on a several
basis (i.e., in general, that no Name is responsible for the debts of another)
and that an act of Parliament would be necessary to turn the LAT from a
several fund to a joint trust. Such a representation is inconsistent with the
mutualization of Names' liabilities represented by such facilities as
Lioncover. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 46. Lloyd's
contention is also inconsistent with the fact that Lloyd's owns several
corporations including two limited liability insurers, four publishing
companies, a pension and a securities corporation, and various managing
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extent that one Name subsidizes another, Lloyd's can make
appropriate adjustments between Names through the Central
Fund or similar device. This would produce a more efficient
collateralization device and would better secure creditors.
Absent such a move to a joint fund, other alternatives
should be explored to reduce the risk of deficiencies: (1) RITC
syndicates should be required to deposit funds in the LAT to
match liabilities of Names which have been assumed by the
RITC syndicates; (2) U.S. creditors should have information
about, and a right of action against, assets posted by such
RITC syndicates; and (3) in the event that the assets in the
LAT are insufficient to meet the obligations of a U.S. creditor,
the creditor should have a direct right of action against funds
"earmarked" by the Central Fund to correct such deficiencies.
Furthermore, the LAT should not be used to pay expenses
extraneous to obligations to U.S. creditors. Section Two of the
Model Act and Section Ten of the Model Regulation are
appropriate models for any amendments to LAT.
c. Reinsurance Trust Fund
The reinsurance trust fund has many similarities to the
LAT, and a number of the problems which are contained
therein are commented upon in Section 2.4(b). These
comments will not be repeated here.
and members' agents. See id., at 28. It is inconsistent with the recent
establishment of two joint funds in the United States: the Lloyd's American
Credit for Reinsurance Joint Asset Trust and the Lloyd's American Surplus
or Excess Lines Insurance Joint Asset Trust. See Lloyd's American Credit
for Reinsurance Joint Asset Trust Deed, Agreement Between Lloyd's of
London and Citibank, N.A., Art. 2 (Sept. 15, 1993) (unpublished agreement,
on file with author) [hereinafter RJAT]. In addition, Lloyd's has many other
collateralization devices operating on the basis of joint liability. See A
Guide to Corporate Membership, LLOYD'S OF LONDON, Sept. 1993, at 22
[hereinafter Corporate Membership]. Lloyd's describes one device as one by
which: "([A]ssets deposited are available to cover liability on any Lloyd's
policy in the relevant jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the deposit
established in that jurisdiction may have been funded in part by members
who are not responsible for those liabilities." Id. Specifically with respect
to the LAT, managing agents may loan a Name's deposits "to other members
(on the same or another syndicate), to enable them to meet their
underwriting liabilities for a current or previous year of account." Id. at 21.
It is therefore evident that Lloyd's can and has found ways to make
collateral accounts operate on a joint basis when it is motivated to do so.
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i. Effective Dates of the Reinsurance Trust
In 1990, the NAIC amended Section 1 (D)(1) of the Model
Act to require a surplus in the amount of $100,000,000 to be
held jointly in trust for the benefit of U.S. ceding insurers.0 8
Effective September 15, 1993, Lloyd's established the Lloyd's
American Credit for Reinsurance Joint Asset Trust Deed
("RJAT"). 10 The RJAT presents a detailed description of the
management of the trust1 and the methods by which a
claimant may proceed to recover under the trust.
1
Nevertheless, the RJAT is unclear as to when a claim must be
brought in order for it to be covered.1 ' There is some
suggestion that it would apply only to claims on contracts
issued during the term of the RJAT. 3 This would create a
gap between the effective date of the RJAT and an earlier date
upon which a state adopted the amended statutory language.
The implications of such a gap are significant for ceding
companies. If this trust fell under Section Two of the Model
Act, a ceding company would have to increase its liabilities by
any shortfall in the trust."' The LAT, however, falls under
Section One of the Model Act. Section One denies credit (i.e.,
an increase in assets or decrease in liabilities) for reinsurance
ceded to a reinsurer that does not qualify under that
section." 5 If this situation is not corrected, or if the intent
See Model Act. supra note 6, § I(D)(1).
10. See RJAT, supra note 107.
110 See id. § 2.6.
... See id. § 2.3.
1"2 For instance, does the RJAT cover claims which arose: (a) at any time;
(b) after the relevant state adopted the $100,000,000 joint trust
requirement; or (c) after the RJAT was established? The RJAT is
ambiguous on these points.
113 See id. § 2.14(a). This Section concerns the trustee's duties on
termination of the trust. One duty is to obtain an auditor's report of the
losses and unearned premiums on reinsurance contracts "issued during the
term of the Trust" as a means of determining final payment from the RJAT.
See id. This suggests that the RJAT only applies to claims on reinsurance
contracts issued subsequent to September 15, 1993 (the date the parties
deemed the RJAT effective). Id.
114 "A reduction from liability ... shall be allowed in an amount not
exceeding the liabilities carried by the ceding insurer and such reduction
shall be in the amount of funds held by or on behalf of the ceding insurer,
including funds held in trust ... ." See Model Act, supra note 6, § 2.
11 Section 1 (D)(1) of the Model Act states that: "Credit shall be allowed
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of the RJAT is not clarified, regulators may deny all credit for
reinsurance ceded to Lloyd's during this gap. In addition,
Section 2.1 of the RJAT allows the trust to terminate under
various circumstances."' Therefore, the RJAT directly
contradicts the mandate of section 1 (D)(3) of the Model Act,
which prohibits termination of the trust as long as there are
any "outstanding obligations due under the reinsurance
agreements subject to the trust.""'
ii. Types of Claims Covered by the RJAT
The RJAT requires trusts to pay claims on an "American
Reinsurance Policy,""' which is defined as reinsurance "with
respect to property or risks situated in a state, district,
territory, commonwealth or possession of the United States
provided that such Policies shall not include life
reinsurance.""9  Because the Model Act includes life
insurance, its exclusion from the RJAT jeopardizes credit for
reinsurance on all life insurance business ceded to Lloyd's.
In addition, the Model Act does not limit exposure of the
$100,000,000 trust to the domestic risks of domestic ceding
companies - it includes all risks of domestic ceding companies,
whether or not located in the United States. This represents
sound public policy since a U.S. ceding company may become
insolvent by its inability to collect reinsurance on either non-
U.S. or U.S. risks.
when the reinsurance is ceded to an assuming insurer which maintains a
trust fund . . . representing the group's liabilities attributable to business
written in the United States and, in addition, the group shall maintain a
trusteed surplus of which $100,000,000 shall be held jointly for the benefit
of United States ceding insurers . . . ." I& § 1.
11 For instance, a trust may be terminated for any reason after five
years of inception. See RJAT, supra note 109, § 2.1. The termination of the
trust is also allowed when the reinsurer: (1) becomes licensed in all states
in which it is conducting business; or (2) enters into an assumption
reinsurance agreement ceding all business covered by the RJAT to a
licensed reinsurer. Id.
117 Model Act, supra note 6, §1(D)3.
118 Id. RJAT, supra note 107, § 2.3.
8 Id. RJAT, supra note 107, § 1.1 (emphasis added).
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iii. Trustee's Fees and Expenses
Similar to the LAT's structure, the trustee of the RJAT is
given first lien on the assets in the trust, in this case up to ten
percent of the assets. 20 It is problematic to grant the
trustee such a right since the purpose of the trust is to protect
U.S. ceding companies. This is particularly true since the
trustee can use the trust assets to resist the claims by trust
beneficiaries. Requiring that the trustee be compensated from
non-trust assets would serve better the intended regulatory
purpose.' 2 '
vi. Enforcing Claims Against the Trust
The RJAT contains claims procedures similar to those
found in the LAT.122  There are, however, important
differences between the RJAT claim procedures and those
found in the LAT. For example, a creditor must exhaust its
remedies against the LAT and the Lloyd's Central Fund
United States Trust ("CFT") before collecting from the
RJAT.123 In addition, the trustee is empowered to determine
whether the claimant has complied with all preconditions to
collecting proceeds, and the trustee's "determination shall be
conclusive and binding on all parties."'24
There is no requirement in the Model Act or Model
Regulation that a creditor exhaust remedies against the LAT
or CFT before asserting rights against the RJAT. In addition,
it is doubtful that a trustee who is compensated out of the
trust should make a "conclusive and binding" determination as
to whether a claimant can collect from the trust.
120 Id. RJAT, supra note 107, §§ 2.2, 3.9.
121 Section 10 (B)(9) of the Model Regulation prohibits the trustee from
invading the any trust established under § 2 of the Model Act on his or her
own behalf. See Model Regulation, supra note 8, §10(B) 9. Similar language
could be applied to trusts established under § 1 of the Model Act.
122 See supra Section 2.3(b).
123 See RJAT supra, note 107, § 2.3(d).
1
2 4 Id.
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v. Remedial Measures
Many of the RJAT's shortcomings (which have not already
been addressed with respect to the LAT) appear to be the
result of drafting errors. 25 Some of the other shortcomings
are created by provisions that do not conform to the letter or
intent of the Model Act and Model Regulation. 121 Therefore,
should regulators exercise their authority to approve amended
language to the RJAT, so that it would comply with the terms
and spirit of the Model Act and Regulation. Many of the
remedial measures noted in Section 2.3(b)(vii) are equally
applicable to the RJAT.
d. U.S. Central Fund Trust 1
The CFT is not required by any state law or regulation. It
was formed on July 17, 1992 for reasons that are not evident
in the document.2 8  Its principal is not tied to a specific
dollar amount or to liabilities. Article 2129 states that the
principal is to consist of Central Fund contributions paid out
of the LAT and other amounts transferred to the trustee.
Article 4 (C)13 ° of the CFT allows the trustee to transfer
out of the CFT any assets in excess of those necessary to
collateralize U.S. liabilities (as calculated in conjunction with
LAT assets).' 3' The LAT is required to maintain a balance
equal to liabilities. 32 This suggests two possible problems
with the CFT: (1) there are no funds in the CFT; or, (2) the
LAT is under-funded.'33 The first alternative means that the
CFT adds no security to U.S. creditors while the other means
the LAT is not in compliance with the Model Act. The
125 See supra Section 2.3(b)(i)-(vi).
126 See supra Section 2.3(b)(i)-(vi).
'2' Lloyd's Central Fund United States Trust Deed, Agreement Between
Lloyd's of London and Citibank, (July 17, 1992) (unpublished agreement, on
file with author) [hereinafter CFT].
126 See id. § 17.
129 Id. § 2.
130 Id, § 4(C).
131 Id.
13 Model Act, supra note 6, § (D)(1).
13 In fact, the LAT should be deemed under-funded if it is net of
reinsurance recoverables. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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principal of the CFT is to be used to: (1) pay defaults by
Names on U.S. business; (2) prevent or reduce the extent of
such a default; (3) compensate any person for making any
payment which reduces the default of a Name; (4) pay the
liability of any Name arising out of American business,
whether or not arising out of a contract of insurance; and, (5)
compensate the trustee.'3
While the purpose of the CFT is unclear, much of its
language mirrors that of the LAT and the RJAT, including
language discussed in previous sections. Since there is no
current regulatory requirement for the CFT, no regulatory
recommendations are appropriate. If the LAT and RJAT are
properly collateralized by and accessible to creditors, there
would be no need for the CFT.
e. Impact of "Equitas" and the Lloyd's Business Plan
Lloyd's has suffered devastating underwriting losses in
recent years. Losses have averaged £275,000 per existing
Name for 1988-1991.135 In May 1994, Lloyd's reported a loss
of £2.05 billion 131 for the underwriting year 1991137 which
134 CFT, supra note 127, § 4.
" See Francis Way, Lloyd's Threatens Names Over Debts, THE
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 13, 1994, at 7.
136 This figure is net of £533 million for estimated double-counting of
underwriting agents' errors and omissions claims and personal stop loss and
estate protection plan policies. Losses for 1991 include £1.14 billion in
reserve strengthening for syndicates in runoff, compared to £678 million in
1990. See Diane Coyle, Lloyd's Loss Has Names Facing New £1.7 Billion
Bill, THE INDEPENDENT, May, 18, 1994, at 27. Most of this reserve
strengthening relates to asbestos, pollution and health hazard claims from
the United States. One hundred and sixty-two of the 349 syndicates
operating in 1991 were unable to close their books, bringing the total
number of accounts in runoff to 478. Fiona Gibson, Global Results 1993,
LLOYD'S OF LONDON, May 1994. Currently, there are 478 syndicates with
open year representing a total stamp capacity of £12 billion. This is greater
than the total market capacity of £11.4 billion for 1991, which has been the
pinnacle of Lloyd's capacity to date. Id. Chatset also believes that the 1991
estimate is low by over £500 million. See Helen MacLeod, '91 Losses to
Lloyd's Names to Top Forecast, Analysts Say, J.CoM., June 28, 1994, at A9.
Current-year losses were reduced from £937 million in 1990 to £615
million in 1991. See id. This factor, when considered in conjunction with the
great increase in old year losses, suggests that Lloyd's may have to choose
between acceptable returns on current business and funding the old year
losses. Corporate capital was attracted to Lloyd's by the assurance that it
would not be liable for old year losses.
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brings losses since 1988 to approximately £8 billion."8' A £1
billion loss is projected for 1992 but a £300 million profit is
projected for 1993 after deducting £500 million for old year
reserve deterioration.
139
Many of these losses are emerging from "long tailed" U.S.
business involving pollution and asbestosis. 40 Nearly forty-
four percent of the £1.4 billion in deterioration is a result of
pollution and asbestos losses. 4' This percentage is
increasing, suggesting that these losses have not peaked."
One financial analyst believes that Lloyd's is still £8.65
billion under-reserved, with £7.35 billion attributable to 1985
and prior year losses.'43 Another analyst believes that the
LAT is under-funded by $7.5 billion and that Lloyd's in general
is under-reserved for asbestos and pollution alone by £11
billion, twice the proven means of the entire membership.'"
13 Lloyd's reports its financial results three years after the end of a
calendar year. Stacy Shapiro, Lloyd's Hopes To Put The Past Behind It And
Return To Profitablitlity, Bus. INS., Aug 29, 1994, at 4.
13 See Gibson, supra note 136, at 1.
13 See Adrian Ladbury, Profitability in Sight for Lloyd's But Old Woes
Expected to Linger, BUS. INS., Aug. 29, 1994, at 79.
140 See CHATSET GUIDE TO SYNDICATE RUN-OFFS 1993, 4 (John Rew &
Charles Sturge eds. 1993).
The issue of inadequate reserving in respect of run-off liabilities
will continue to plague Lloyd's Names. There is still an
unquantifiable degree of under-reserving against long-tail liabilities
incurred before 1986. Management at those syndicates most
affected by potential under-reserving will have to make further cash
calls on their Names, and the legitimacy of such calls will have to
be decided by the courts if the worst-affected Names continue to
protest.
MOODY'S, supra note 82, at 2. Little relief can be expected from these long-
tail liabilities in the near term: "Our expected scenario projects future
required reserve additions for the industry's [U.S.] environmental and
asbestos exposures totaling $260 billion, spread over 15 years for asbestos
claims and 25 years for environmental claims. This scenario has a net
present value of $132 billion ... ." See A.M. BEST Co. Environmental/
Asbestos Liability Exposures: A P/C Industry Black Hole, Mar. 28, 1994, at
6-7.
141 CHATSET LTD. LLOYD'S LEAGUE TABLES FOR 1991 2 (June 1994).
142 Id. at 7.
1 Id. In December 1994, Chatset issued a report in which it increased
its estimate of under-reserved business to £10.2 billion as of the end of 1993.
See Janet Porter, Report: Lloyd's Reserves Fall Far Short of Future
Claims, J. COM., Dec. 14, 1994, at 11A.
'" Randolph M. Fields, Lloyd's of London: The Adequacy of Financial
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Predictably, these losses, and fears of greater losses, have led
to a sharp reduction in the number of Names and syndicates
underwriting actively at Lloyd's. 45
In order to counter the decrease in capacity and inject new
confidence in the marketplace, the leadership of Lloyd's
announced the first ever business plan for Lloyd's. Its
centerpiece was the inclusion of corporate capital as Names for
the first time in the history of Lloyd's. In order to attract
corporate capital, however, it was necessary to find a means to
wall off or "ring fence" corporate capital from the losses
emerging from "old years" (i.e., prior to 1985).
14 6
A critical part of the operation is a new reinsurance
company, Equitas.147 This new reinsurer would assume the
liabilities of all Names for years prior to 1986. Syndicates will
be required to reserve relevant liabilities on a uniform basis.
Names will be asked to fund any shortfall in reserves on a
gross basis and then reserves will be discounted to create a
surplus.14' Equitas will be licensed and regulated by the
Department of Trade and Industry.
149
Resources to Meet Claims on Old Years Policies, Apr. 1994, at 2-3.
14 In an October 1993 report, Moody's stated that the number of Names
was 19,496, down from 32,433 in 1988. See MOODY'S, supra note 82, at 5.
Active syndicates have dropped from 400 in 1989 to 178 in 1994. See Fiona
Gibson, Lloyd's Record £2.05 Billion Market Loss For 1991, LLOYD'S LIST,
May 18, 1994, at 1. For 1994, Lloyd's had 17,624 individual Names and 95
corporate Names. See Stacy Shapiro, Lloyd's Hopes to Put the Past Behind
it and Return to Profitability, Bus. INS., Aug. 29, 1994, at 3.
146 See generally CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP, supra note 88, at 32-37.
147 Equitas was originally dubbed "NewCo." See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
1 "The business plan stated that NewCo. would discount reserves to
generate its capital. However, time and distance covers may already have
taken substantial benefit from the time value of loss payments into
account." See Heidi E. Hutter, NewCo.-A Way Forward, THE SON, Apr. 1994,
at 6.
141 See id. See generally BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 74, at 17-23. Cf.
Howard, Lloyd's Struggles, supra note 79, at 3 (discussing the establishment
of NewCo). Howard has noted:
The NewCo project will be developing structured payment plans so
that Names will have a period of time to satisfy their obligations to
NewCo. Since the liabilities are long-tail, she said that NewCo.
won't need all the money in place on the first day of operations
(which is planned for Jan. 1, 1996).... 'We don't want to bankrupt
Names who intend to fulfill and discharge their obligations, but just
can't do it in one big chunk.' Ms. [Heidi] Hutter[, director for the
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Some believe that the Equitas proposal is an extremely
ambitious undertaking. 50 It involves thousands of syndicate
years and a much greater number of debtors, dead and alive,
solvent and insolvent. 'The first step ... [is] creation of a
single database covering all known Lloyd's liabilities dating
from 1985 and prior years which can be used to assist in the
calculation of appropriate reserves for outstanding claims and
claims 'incurred but not reported' (IBNRs)."151 This may
prove a daunting task in itself."2
A subsequent step is to set reserves based on "mandatory
establishment of NewCo.] continued. Besides calculating reserves,
the second major problem facing Ms. Hutter and her team is the
capitalization of NewCo. The usual DTI guidelines are for
capitalization and authorizations of live insurance companies that
will actively write new business, she said. NewCo, she said, "is
effectively a run-off company. No one has really said how much
capital is needed to set up a run-off company.
Id. There also are suggestions that Equitas should reinsure years
subsequent to 1986 or that it should develop a "LiveCo" subsidiary to
assume new risk. See Fiona Gibson, Lloyd's to Consider NewCo Cash
Earner, LLOYD'S LIST, Jun. 7, 1994. Obviously, Lloyd's has not yet
determined how to structure Equitas so that it will be acceptable to Names,
creditors and the DTI.
150 Malcolm Mackenzie, Chairman of the Lloyd's Underwriting Agents
Association, has observed that the Equitas effort is to "set up the largest
reinsurance company in the world." Stacy Shapiro, Lloyd's Pinning its
Hopes on NewCo, BUS. INS., Aug. 29, 1994, at 24, 28. While this may be
true with respect to liabilities, the issue is the ability to obtain assets which
equal or exceed the liabilities.
1'5 BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 74, at 19. There is a Lloyd's working
party examining inclusion with Equitas of post-1985 liabilities currently
assumed by CentreWrite. See Fiona Gibson, Open Year Study Will Help
Assess NewCo Future, LLOYD'S LIST, Mar. 15, 1994.
152 David Springbett, 'Llysold': An Improved Solution for Lloyd's, LLOYD'S
OF LONDON, July 1993, at 6.
Lloyd's old records are in an appalling state and are often non-
existent. Often underwriters kept no records whatsoever of what
they had written, but merely relied upon the brokers honesty to
close (pay) the risk. Brokers' archival records are often the only
source of information and again these are sometimes non-existent,
or impossible to find. Sometimes the only evidence of a contract is
the policy itself, and that is in the hands of the claimants' lawyers!
To check the old files as is suggested in the [Lloyd's Business
Plan] is equivalent to dreaming. There are millions of files involved
and these are scattered over countless broking houses. Id.
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standards for reserving and. . . a common methodology."1 53
Standardizing innumerable reserving methodologies for
thousands of syndicate years should prove to be a difficult
technical task.M Indeed, the Equitas project missed the end
of 1994 timetable for sharing reserve projections with
syndicates. 55 However, the reallocation of liabilities that
results would be the most controversial issue.
Names that are found to owe additional funds (to the
extent they are solvent) 56 are liable to resist bitterly
additional payments for several reasons: (1) disagreement with
the calculation; (2) inaccuracy of previous loss estimates; 1 '
153 BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 74, at 20.
154 "Because of poor past regulation, many syndicates have been able to
manipulate their reserving according to the extent to which they were able
to confuse their auditors." Id. at 6. Lloyd's has working parties
approaching reserves from three different angles: (1) global trends; (2)
projections from Lloyd's and London market statistics; and (3) extrapolation
from experience of syndicates on pre-1986 business. Business Plan Progress
Report, LLOYD'S (LLOYD'S OF LONDON, U.K.), May 1994, at 13.
Heidi Hutter, project director of the Equitas project estimates that "there
are 550 syndicate 'lives' with liabilities pre-dating 1986 which will require
[550] reinsurance quotations from NewCo." Howard, Lloyd's Struggles, supra
note 79, at 3. This article does not define a "syndicate life" but presumably
it is all years of a single syndicate on which there are open claims. The fact
that Equitas will issue a quotation suggests that participation by syndicate
will be optional, which means that Equitas will suffer from adverse selection
(i.e., only the syndicates with the worst results will desire reinsurance). See
id.
155 Project director Heidi Hutter stated, "[w]e did not want to come out
with premature estimates of Lloyd's reserving requirements based on
incomplete or unreconciled data. We did not want to produce one figure this
December and then find six months later that we needed to revise it
drastically." Equitas Project, LLOYD'S OF LONDON, Oct. 1994, at 2.
158 Mechanisms designed to protect the solvency of Names are breaking
down: "Hundreds of Lloyd's names who prudently reinsured themselves
against massive insurance losses have been told their claims are unlikely to
be met in full .... [Blecause two insurance companies, Stockholm Re and
Municipal General Insurance, which participated in the reinsurance of
names' [personal stop-loss] policies have collapsed, obligations are not being
met." Sarah Bagnall, Names Stop-Loss Warning, THE TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
157 A comparison of the Annual Report and Accounts for one syndicate,
non-marine syndicate 528, is indicative. The 1987 Report characterizes the
reinsurance to the close of the 1983 year after five years as "the closing of
an unhappy chapter in the history of the Syndicate" as a result of its U.S.
Liability Account. Unfortunately, the problem was not closed but merely
moved to another chapter. The 1991 Report noted that the 1989
underwriting year would be left open due to the "wide range of estimated
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(3) belief they are being sheared like sheep;158 (4) blame of
U.S. creditors and the U.S. legal system for losses far beyond
those reasonably expected; (5) unwillingness to fund on a gross
reserves to cover (U.S.) asbestos and pollution losses in respect of business
written during 1986 and prior years. The great majority of the reserves
relate to business written in 1983 and prior." 1991 Annual Report, at 18.
Without a cap on liabilities, there is little reason for Names to believe their
liabilities will not continue to escalate.
'" The reference is to a quote attributed to a senior Lloyd's official: "If
God had not meant them to be sheared, He would not have made them
sheep." Julian Barnes, The Deficit Millionaires, NEW YORKER, Sept. 20,
1993, at 92 [hereinafter Deficit Millionaires]. Some Names who have
incurred crushing losses believe that they were lured into the marketplace
to provide capacity for syndicates with heavy exposure to pollution and
asbestos. One source has noted:
As investors delve into the reasons for their crushing losses, there
is growing evidence that Lloyd's insiders, the so-called working
names-investors, brokers, agents and underwriters-had early
warnings of the looming disaster, warnings they did not share with
prospective investors. In hindsight, the 1980s are beginning to look
increasingly like an era when Lloyd's brought in new investors to
take on hugely expensive risks from it more established names ....
It was in asbestos, in particular, that long-established Lloyd's
names seem to have steered away from insurance lines that were
peddled aggressively to newcomers. From 1984 to 1988, well after
the first warnings from lawyers and accountants were received,
market agents often ushered new investors directly into some of the
riskiest of Lloyd's more than 200 syndicates, correspondence and
litigation indicates. The new names often could not get into the
syndicates they desired, as these already were filled by established
names, who make up about 20% of the current total of 18,000
names. And in many cases, the loss-ridden names claim, they were
persuaded by Lloyd's agents to join syndicates where the risks were
never made clear.
Peter Truell, Mess at Lloyd's May Have a Darker Side, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
1994, at A12. The alleged purpose for obtaining new Names and suppressing
losses was not simply to spread losses but also to: (1) generate finders'
commissions; (2) generate illusory profit commissions for agents; and (3)
increase the value of agencies for sale. ULTIMATE RISK, supra note 79, at
287-90.
For a well-written account of the plight of these Names, See Deficit
Millionaires, supra. With respect to the disastrous Gooda Walker
syndicates: "A breakdown of all the Gooda Walker members for the years
1983 to 1989 (when the dangers of the L.M.X. spiral were being run) show
that only ten percent were insider Names - half what you might expect if
the market dealt fairly between the two segments and of its members. On
Syndicate 387, a key location of financial horror, only three percent of the
Names were insiders." Id. at 84. The result is litigation by 17,000 current
and former Names against Names agents and managing agents. Parliament
made Lloyd's immune from suit in 1982, otherwise it too would be a
defendant. Id.
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basis claims that are not yet due; and (6) fear that funds
contributed will pay the debts of other names.
Moreover, Equitas, as a reinsurance facility, cannot negate
the liability of Names to their creditors. As a result, the
Names remain liable to creditors if Equitas becomes insolvent.
There would seem to be little incentive for Names to pay their
"fair share" to Equitas if they may be liable to pay this "fair
share" a second time as a result of the insolvency of Equitas
due to: (a) under reserving by Equitas; or (b) failure of other
Names to pay their "fair share." It is not evident that Lloyd's
can force Names to adopt the Equitas alternative15 or can
extinguish the liabilities of Names to creditors. The Chairman
of Lloyd's has confirmed to Parliament that the failure to
collect sufficient assets to Equitas could seriously impact
capital markets. 60 It remains to be seen what incentives
Lloyd's will be able to offer Names to buy into Equitas.
Even Lloyd's admits "[tlhe Newco proposals are still at an
early stage of development and there can be no certainty that
they will prove viable."'61 Some underwriters are declining
to close years because they doubt the wherewithal of Equitas
1. While Lloyd's may find a Name no longer "fit and proper" to act as a
Name at Lloyd's, many Names may have no interest in continuing as a
Name and may, in fact, wish that Lloyd's had made such a finding many
years earlier. See the comments of Heidi Hutter, project director of Equitas:
"Ultimately, reinsurance into NewCo will be a mandatory exercise for the
entire Lloyd's market. That's the way we can achieve the structural
advantages of centralization which we expect to spring from the company."
Lloyd's Faces Challenge of Open Years, INS. BROKER, Oct./Nov. 1994, at 52.
160 David Rowland, Chairman of Lloyds, testified before a select
committee of the House of Commons in February of 1995:
The bad news is that the Names will be charged, later this year, a
premium to off-load their liabilities into Equitas, and that premium
could be very high ....
Conservative MP Quentin Davies asked: 'If Equitas fixes its
premiums at such a level and the new cash calls are resisted, could that
not precipitate the collapse of Lloyd's?'
Mr. Rowland replied: 'You're right. We depend on collecting
from the Names. If Lloyd's has to call up money it cannot obtain,
clearly that will affect its ongoing trading.'
Clare Sambrook, Lloyd's Future is New the All-Risks Question, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 11, 1995, at B2, B3.
.6. Corporate Membership, supra note 107, at 32.
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to meet its obligations.6 2
One analyst believes that the Equitas ring fence will cost
between £4 and £6 billion and that Names on the old years
could only pay a fraction of this amount in a lump sum.'
Given the prospect of being called upon to pay additional
losses, financially beleaguered Names are reacting in
predictable fashion. Christopher Stockwell, Chair of the
Lloyd's Names Association's Working Party, stated, "[wle're
not paying because there ain't no more money."' There is
open discussion among Names of hiding assets from Lloyd's
and other creditors.'65 Lloyd's is reacting by expanding its
162 Robert Terman, Murray upset for Lloyd's, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar.
27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Libary, Curnws File.
One of Lloyd's of London's most respected figures has set the cat
among Lime Street's pigeons by refusing to close the 1991
underwriting account for the £115 million Syndicate 510. By leaving
it open, Colin Murray, who heads the Kiln insurance agency and
was once tipped to chair Lloyd's, has presented a challenge to
market chairman David Rowland's plan to defuse the time bomb of
past policies. . . .Murray's decision casts doubt on whether
underwriting groups can honestly close their books. . . .But
Murray, whose Names have enjoyed a near-40 per cent
underwriting profit, refuses to close because he cannot see how
Newco can settle the 550 or more contracts itis likely to be offered.
Assessing the claims risk for past years, he sees 'a big profit' for
1993. "1I cannot distribute profits unless I close," he said. "But I
cannot close if we are later going to have to go back to Names."
Insurers fear that the reason given by Murray for keeping
Syndicate 510 open-that the risk on past long tail cover assembled
under Newco is too great-applies to most other syndicates. If no
syndicate need close, it makes a nonsense of the Lloyd's system.
Murray insists that closing the syndicate's accounts would have
been unfair-and, more importantly, would have left new joiners
with potential liabilities for the past years.
16. See 1990 Lloyd's: League Tables, Chatset Ltd., Sept. 1993, at ii.
"Clearly NewCo cannot call Names for more than 10% to 30% in one lump
sum and hope to get paid by more than a minority." MARKET SYNDICATE
MANAGEMENT CHATSET GUIDE TO SYNDICATE RUN-OFFS 1993 4 (Nov. 1993).
1" Howard, Names Balk, supra note 78, at 27. Mr. Stockwell went on to
blame losses from the United States and the U.S. legal system for the
problem. The Society of Names has observed, "Lloyd's must be made to face
a total non-payment by Names, and be forced to direct its fire at the holders
of policies which should never have been sold. All old policies must be
allowed to erode to the extent that the Names who underwrote them are
insolvent or dead."IHave No Gun But I Can Spit, THE SON (Soc'y of Names,
Adstock, Buckingham, U.K.), Apr. 1994, at 1.
65 Lloyd's Sets out on Mission Impossible, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 12,
1994 notes: "In members' circles there is talk of distancing assets, setting
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debt collection capabilities. 6
Names have been further angered by Lloyd's attempt to
appropriate the recoveries of delinquent Names against
negligent Names' agents and underwriting agents." In
turn, U.K. Names have asserted a number of defenses to
actions by Lloyd's to reimburse the Central Fund for claims
paid on behalf of delinquent Names. It appears that these
defenses are having some success in offsetting or at least
up offshore trusts, giving homes away to children, buying properties
abroad." One said: "As you can imagine, quite a lot will put their money
where Lloyd's can't get it." Id. Michael Denny, a leader of Names on the
Gooda Walker syndicate commented: "There is no point in pursuing people
who can't pay and the ones who won't pay have had two years to distance
their assets. And Lloyd's can't tell who could pay and is worth pursuing.
Defaulting Names owing £375 million live outside the U.K. and collection
actions against them can be problematic for Lloyd's. A number of debtors
are thought to have moved to debtor sanctuaries.
... Lloyd's is poised to hire several debt collection specialists to recover
outstanding debts from thousands of Names. Andrew Jack, Lloyd's Set to
Hire Debt Collectors to Chase Names, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at 1. The
balances are estimated at £2 billion. Shapiro, supra note 137, at 4. There
is an estimated £1.3 billion due from 14,000 Names who have ceased
underwriting and have withdrawn from the marketplace. Lisa Buckingham,
Lloyd's Decides to Get Tough, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 1994, at 15.
"6 Lloyd's has proposed changes to the Premium Trust Deeds that
would require that any recovery by a Name against a negligent Names'
agent or underwriting agent be paid into premium trust from which Lloyd's
can withdraw funds to pay overdue losses from Names. According to an
October 20, 1994 letter to Names from David Rowland, Chairman of Lloyd's
the effect of the change:
[Wiould be to require the proceeds of litigation or settlement (relating
to any year of account) to be used to pay liabilities outstanding at the time
of receipt in respect of drawdowns from the Central Fund for 1987 and
subsequent years of account; and/or
A. cash calls and closed year losses for these years of account.
Letter from David Rowland, Chairman of Lloyd's, to Unspecified Names
(Oct. 20 1994). "Lloyd's sources confirmed the move was prompted by the
Department of Trade and Industry and the Bank of England. They are
concerned that the Lloyd's Central Fund, designed to protect policyholders
in the event of nonpayment of claims by Names, is running dangerously
low." William Gleeson, Lloyd's says rules change is crucial, INDEPENDENT,
Oct. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Libary, Curnws File. Some Names,
as well as other creditors of these Names, criticized this proposal as seeking
an unfair preferential creditor status. Nonetheless, the Department of
Trade and Industry approved such a change to the Premium Trust Deed.
It is expected, however, that the Names will challenge this action in the
courts. Helen MacLeod, Legality of Lloyd's Move on funds Remain
Uncertain, J.CoM., Mar. 6, 1995, at 7A.
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delaying reimbursement by Names."'8 Five hundred sixteen
U.S. Names are seeking the assistance of the U.S. courts in
avoiding $3 billion in losses. 6 ' The case law arising out of
these U.S. efforts is provocative but inconclusive to date.'
' Lloyd's v. Clementson and Mason, Supreme Court of Judicature,
Court of Appeal, Nov. 1994. The defendants asserted various defenses to
collection actions which were dismissed as a matter of law by the lower
court. The Court of Appeal reversed on two defenses, namely that Lloyd's
may have violated European Community competition laws by use of the
Central Fund to offset poor underwriting and by discrimination in
accounting rules between reinsurance ceded by syndicates to other
syndicates rather than to other reinsurers. Lloyd's has decided not to
appeal. Toby Shelley, Lloyd's Halts Petitioning of Lords on Fund, LLOYD'S
LIST, Dec. 2, 1994, at 1. Whatever the ultimate result, it will take several
years to reach a final conclusion on the merits. In the interim, these
defenses will be used by Names to avoid reimbursing the Central Fund
which, in turn, will put increased pressure on various of Lloyd's security
devices.
169 The forum-selection clause signed by Names requires actions to be
brought in the United Kingdom, which is viewed as more sympathetic to
Lloyd's than the United States. Nonetheless, U.S. Names are arguing that
they were fraudulently induced to sign these contracts. John Jennings,
Americans Sue Lloyd's in U.S. Court, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Aug. 29, 1994,
at 1. Twenty-six U.S. Names are suing Lloyd's U.S. counsel alleging that
the firm knew of outstanding long-tail losses and that failure to disclose
these losses was a breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation and
legal malpractice. Gavin Souter, U.S. Names Still Pressing For Home Court
Advantage, BUS. INS., Aug. 29, 1994, at 20, 24. Canadian Names are
litigating to resist reimbursing banks that issued letters of credit which
have been drawn down to pay claims. Brian Cox, Canadian Names Contest
Claims By Lloyd's, Banks, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Oct. 24, 1994, at 43.
"Sarah Gibb, a committee member of the Gooda Walker action group ...
[has commented], "'[t]he English Names will go into uproar if the Americans
have a more attractive scheme.'" Id. Clare Sambrook, Lloyd's to Approach
American Names, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 6, 1994, at 24.
1  Lloyd's Name Denied Injunction Against Draw on Lett or Credit, 5
MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS, REINSURANCE No. 15, at 7, 7-8 (Dec. 7, 1994)
(discussing Leslie v. Lloyd's, CA. NO. H-90-1907 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1994)).
The court consolidated two actions. The first was brought by Leslie, a
Name, for a preliminary injunction to prohibit Lloyd's from drawing down
on Leslie's letter of credit in order to be reimbursed for losses paid on
Leslie's behalf. The second was an action for monetary damages by Leslie
against Lloyd's based on alleged breaches of deceptive trade practices laws,
securities laws and of fiduciary duties. The findings of fact and conclusions
of law in this case relate only to the preliminary injunction portion of the
consolidated action. Among other things, the court found: (a) that Leslie
had requested to be put on low risk syndicates but, in fact, was put on high
risk syndicates; (b) that misrepresentations were made concerning the
ability of a Name to limit losses by resigning; (c) that misrepresentations
were made to the effect that unlimited liability was a technicality and that
the possibility of serious losses was remote; (d) Lloyd's was aware, but did
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Inability to collect losses from Names could precipitate a crisis
for the Central Fund and, as a result, for Lloyd's ability to
pass solvency tests.
The continuing poor results for 1991 are taking a toll on
Names. Five thousand Names have defaulted on their
obligations, 260 have been placed in bankruptcy and a number
have committed suicide. 1 Two thousand Names have
applied for relief from the Members' Hardship Committee
which is suggested as an alternative to bankruptcy. 72
Names who are Members of Parliament and who become
bankrupt must resign, which could impact on the Conservative
Party's narrow majority.7
Some observers suggest that there are limits on the
willingness of Lloyd's to support Equitas:
Moody's detects a growing sentiment within Lloyd's
not inform Names, of serious under-reserving of losses for pollution and
asbestos; (e) that Lloyd's embarked on a program of increasing its number
of Names which had the effect of spreading losses from insiders to outsiders;
and (f) that choice of laws and forum selection provisions were incorporated
into Leslie's General Undertaking contract with Lloyd's when Lloyd's
was aware of serious under-reserving for pollution and asbestos but Leslie
was not. Ultimately, the court denied the preliminary injunction, however,
on the bases that Leslie failed to prove irreparable injury for which
monetary damages would be insufficient and failed to prove fraud which so
vitiated the transaction as to deny Leslie any value from the transaction.
It remains to be seen what influence the judge's findings of fact on the
preliminary injunction action will have when that same judge considers
Leslie's action for monetary damages. See id.
171 Roger Nuttall, Lloyd's Critic Bankrupted by £3 Million Losses, DAILY
EXPRESS, July 6, 1994, at 3. The article states that Christopher Stockwell,
chairman of the Names Association Working Party, "has claimed that more
than 30 suicides have been linked with Lloyd's losses, although others
dispute the figure, insisting that no more than eight deaths can be positively
associated with losses by Names." Id.
172 Sarah Bagnall, Lloyd's Names Seek Charity, THE TIMES, July 8, 1994,
at 2. The Hardship Committee is not a complete defense, however. Banks
that guaranty the obligations of Names may still place a Name in
bankruptcy. Diane Coyle, Key Lloyd's name Bankrupted; Leader of Investor'
Group Blames Losses in Market After Bank Acts Over £2.86 Million Debt,
THE INDEPENDENT, July 6, 1994, at 27.
173 Fifty-one Conservative Members of Parliament were reported by
Labour MP Peter Hain to owe more than £22 million to Lloyd's. "But Mr.
Hain claims that MPs have not been forced to stump up the cash because
some would be bankrupted, forcing them to quit their seats and wiping out
Mr. Major's slender majority." Scandal of the Tory MPs who Owe £22
Million, THE PEOPLE, July 24, 1994, at 6.
[Vol. 16:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/2
COLLATERALIZATION FOR REINSURERS
that some liability claims and awards are becoming so
large as to cease to be entirely reasonable. On the
basis of such a rationalization, it seems conceivable
that future management at the Council of Lloyd's may
not feel obligated to support NewCo if it gets into
difficulties due to an "unreasonable" level of liability
claims from across the Atlantic. Indeed, there is
already a strong inference in the idea of establishing
NewCo as a limited liability insurer outside Lloyd's
that the market wishes to signal to cedents (and
through them to the American legal profession) that a
clear and tangible ceiling is to be set to the sums that
Lloyd's is prepared to lose in respect of old liability
claims. They are effectively saying that they are
unwilling to pay away much more than the substantial
reserves, the future investment income, and the capital
of the proposed NewCo. 1 4
This situation makes the several Lloyd's trusts in the
United States critical to U.S. creditors. Initially, they may be
the only source of recovery if "New Lloyd's" with corporate
capital is successful in cutting losses on old years adrift.175
This heightens the importance of the adequacy and
accessibility of trust assets.
"' MOODY'S, supra note 83, at 12. John Rew, co-editor of Chatset has
noted that Lloyd's has liabilities "way beyond its assets." He has likened
Lloyd's to a ship towing a barge named Equitas which contains the garbage
from past years. "They'll let the rope out slowly until at last it's so long that
no longer will many associate the barge with Lloyd's and then they'll cut the
cord [and move for a commutation]." Lisa S. Howard, Lloyd's Seen Moving
to Commutation, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Nov. 8, 1993, at 1, 6. Another
commentator has stated that the "introduction of corporate capital appeared
to be a way of allowing Lloyd's to trade profitably into the future while
quietly ditching those who had been ruined by its negligence and
incompetence." ULTIMATE RISK, supra note 79, at 268.
' "However, a spokeswoman for Lloyd's in New York, who did not wish
to be named, pointed out that the largest of these liabilities, for instance,
asbestosis, originated in the United States. In any case, it was unlikely
Lloyd's would try to repatriate the money held in the Lloyd's American
Trust Fund, although in theory it could, she said." Helen MacLeod, Some
Policyholders Fear US Claims Won't Be Paid, J.COM., Dec. 14, 1994, at
11A. An official with the New York Insurance Deparment has commented:
'I can tell you that with respect to the U.S. trust funds, we as regulators
will not let the money leave this country." Stacy Shapiro, U.S. Sevting of
Lloyd's, Bus. INS., Dec. 12, 1994 at 10.
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These trusts may be the only realistic source of funds for
Equitas. In order to properly capitalize Equitas, it may be
necessary to remove assets from the U.S. trusts and contribute
them to Equitas in London where these assets can support
worldwide losses. Such a result clearly would violate U.S.-
Credit for Reinsurance laws and destroy the collateralization
devices contained in such laws.
3. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Charges to the NAIC Reinsurance Task Force for 1993
included an examination of the devices used to collateralize
the obligations of unlicensed reinsurers under the Model
Act. 7 ' During the course of 1993, the NAIC considered
many of the issues described above. The Reinsurance
Association of America ("RAA") advocated a number of changes
to the Model Act with respect to collateralization devices. The
most significant of these changes would have required that the
LAT be a joint trust and that it be exclusively for the benefit
of U.S. ceding insurers.
The RAA argued that a joint fund would provide a better
use of the same assets and would ameliorate the dangers to
creditors of a several fund."7 The rationale for exclusivity
was that there should be one trust for surplus lines and a
separate one for reinsurance. Commingling these
collateralization devices can make it difficult to determine
whether the trust has sufficient assets for all classes of
creditors.
Little progress was made on this issue in 1993 and it was
held over into 1994. In February of that year, the Reinsurance
Working Group rejected the "joint" proposal. Later in that
year, however, the Working Group adopted the "exclusivity"
position, drafted investment guidelines for trust assets and
defined liabilities to be collateralized to include losses which
have been incurred but have not been reported to
insurers.'78 The Working Group has rejected the argument
1.6 See NAIC Proceedings, 1st Quarter 1993, at 391 [hereinafter 1993
NAIC Proceedings].
177 See supra Section 2.2.1 (b)(iii).
178 1994 NAIC Proceedings (unpublished) (recorded by the author).
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that trust assets should be net of reinsurance recoverable n9
It remains to be seen whether these reforms will become part
of the Model Act and Model Regulation and whether they will
become law in a significant number of states.
While the Working Group has not adopted the most
significant reform, a joint trust, the reforms which have been
proposed are material improvements. In addition scrutiny of
this area is likely to continue for some time. Issues often take
years to develop at the NAIC and they are often influenced by
outside events such as insolvencies, Congressional
investigations and public identification of problem areas. 8 '
A number of states are concerned about collateralization issues
and have taken or are considering taking individual action on
point.''
3.1. The Trump Card: §304 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code
As noted in prior sections, unlicensed insurers are required
to post collateral in order to write insurance in the United
States and unlicensed reinsurers are required to post collateral
in order for ceding companies to take credit for this
reinsurance, either as an asset or a deduction from liability.
The purpose of collateral requirements is to protect U.S.
creditors from defaults by unlicensed insurers and reinsurers,
particularly as a result of insolvency. Unfortunately, the
intervention of Federal Bankruptcy Code Section 3041 2 can
17. See supra Section 2.3(ii).
180 See 1993 NAIC Proceedings, supra note 176, at 391 (suggesting a
Reinsurance Task Force charge that reacts to Congressman Dingell's). See
also H.R. 1290, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
181 See Meg Fletcher, U.S. Regulators Step Up Oversight of Lloyd's, BUS.
INS., Aug. 29, 1994, at 42 (reporting that Michigan has discontinued a
special exception for Lloyd's and is requiring additional collateralization for
ceding companies heavily dependent on reinsurance from Lloyd's); New York
is considering requiring more detailed financial information and is
examining the LAT; Louisiana has called for a white listing process for alien
insurers and reinsurers and the NAIC is studying this proposal. Id.
182 11 U.S.C. §304 (1988). This section reads as follows:
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing
with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign
representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party
in interest does not timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court
may -
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completely undermine the protections contemplated by these
collateralization requirements.
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code excludes from coverage
domestic insurance companies and foreign insurance
companies which are doing business in the United States. An
ancillary proceeding, however, can be instituted with respect
to a foreign insurer which is not doing business in the United
States but has assets there." This would include
unlicensed insurers and reinsurers which assume U.S.
business but have no offices or employees in the United States.
The purpose of Section 304, as stated in the statutory
language and as noted in the cases cited below, is to protect
the assets of a foreign bankrupt from claims in multiple
proceedings in various nations and to recognize comity with
respect to foreign bankruptcy courts. The effect of Section 304
is to allow bankruptcy judges to enjoin U.S. creditors from
enforcing their rights under collateral trust agreements, turn
over trust assets to foreign bankruptcy courts and force U.S.
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of -
(A) any action against -
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in
such foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor
with respect to such property, or any act or the commencement or
continuation of any judicial proceedingto create or enforce alien against the
property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of
such property, to such foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(b) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (c) of this
section, the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical
and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with -
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such
estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice
and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of
such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance
with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for
the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
"'3 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b) & 304(a) (1988).
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creditors to pursue their claims in a foreign nation.'"
Section 304 petitions are being used in a number of current
foreign receiverships " ' and case law is still evolving. One
observer has noted that "the perceived wisdom, at least in the
UK, is that protection through section 304 should be sought at
an early stage of an insolvency proceeding concerning a foreign
insurance company which has significant creditors and assets
in the U.S. and which is involved in litigation in the U.S."18
A few examples demonstrate the ability of Section 304 to
seriously undermine the efficacy of insurance and reinsurance
collateralization laws.
In Re Lines18 involved the River Plate Reinsurance
Company which was domiciled in Bermuda and which had
established a trust in New York to serve "as security for its
American insureds and reinsureds whose claims may be
payable in currency of the United States of America .. .. ",188
The trust was similar to the LAT in that it required a claimant
to file a certified judgment with the trustee and wait for thirty
days before the claim was perfected.
A U.S. creditor filed a certified judgment with the trust on
September 2, 1987 and two days later a receivership petition
was filed in Bermuda. The court ruled that the creditor's
interest had not been perfected, due to the thirty-day waiting
period, and that creditors must pursue their rights through the
Bermudian-court.
A more recent case, In Re Rubin,189 involved the receiver
of Integrity Insurance Company ("Integrity") who was seeking
to enforce a judgment against Israel Reinsurance Company
Ltd. ("Israel Reinsurance"), domiciled in Israel. The trust
agreement at issue was similar to the LAT and the trust found
184 See 11 U.S.C. § 304(b).
18. See Roger Enock & Geoff Nicholas, London: The Company Market
and Insolvency-Schemes of Arrangement, Section 304, and the
Policyholders Protection Board, at 96 (Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. A-679, 1993) [hereinafter Enock & Nicholas, London]; Scott D.
Gilbert, Insurer Insolvencies and Reinsurance in the U.S. and London
Markets: A Policyholder's Viewpoint, at 14-18, (paper presented at Mealey's
1994 Insurance Insolvency & Reinsurance Roundtable, Mar. 3, 1994).
186 Enock & Nicholas, London, supra note 185, at 96.
187 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
18 Id. at 268-69 (quoting the trust agreement).
189 160 B.R. 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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in the case In Re Lines in that a creditor must file a certified
claim and wait thirty days before a claim is perfected. Since
Integrity had not completed the necessary steps to perfect its
claim, the court followed In Re Lines. Pursuant to the petition
of Israel Reinsurance, the funds remained in trust in the
United States. The court ordered a pro-rata distribution to
creditors once the validity of claims had been determined by
the bankruptcy court in Israel.
Although Bankruptcy Courts seem to favor section 304
petitions by foreign insurers, 9 ' this process has negative
implications for the efficacy of current collateralization devices
for unlicensed insurers and reinsurers. It is not evident at
this stage that tinkering with the collateralization devices
themselves will provide a sufficient answer. Perhaps the best
answer is to exclude from section 304 collateral which is
posted pursuant to insurance laws.
4. CONCLUSION
There are significant gaps in the protection offered to U.S.
ceding companies by collateralization devices required by state
insurance law for unlicensed reinsurers. These gaps are
dangerous to the public because they can imperil the solvency
of ceding companies. The NAIC is seeking to improve credit for
reinsurance laws, but problems remain with the impediments
to creditors contained both in the law and in trust documents.
U.S. creditors of foreign reinsurers would be benefitted
substantially if regulators enforced current law on multiple
creditor collateralization devices. Credit for reinsurance laws
So Marialuisa S. Gallozzi, Consequences for the U.S. Policyholder of
London Company Insolvencies, 153-54 (Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. A-679, 1993).
London Company insolvencies present substantial challenges to
U.S. policyholders and other creditors. To date, creditors have met
with little success in obtaining relief (via the courts or via
stipulation) from section 304 orders in the United States. The
courts have exhibited a tendency to defer to foreign bankruptcy
proceedings, particularly those under English law, unless there is
some fundamental unfairness to a certain type of creditor or need
for a resolution of an issue under U.S. law. For that reason, the
U.S. proceedings are expected to result in a turnover of U.S. assets
to the provisional liquidators and in the centralized administration
of those assets in the English insolvency proceedings.
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could be improved by: (1) eliminating section I(D) of the Model
Act; (2) making the multiple creditor trust joint and
exclusively for the benefit of U.S. creditors; or (3) making the
collateralization devices described in section 1 (D) more similar
to section 2 collateral devices.' In addition, regulators
must scrutinize trust documents more closely to determine
compliance with the spirit and letter of the insurance laws.
Finally, creditors and insurance regulators alike should seek
to amend the Bankruptcy Code to prevent section 304 from
undercutting the essential purpose of state laws requiring
collateral by unlicensed insurers and reinsurers.
'"" Model Act, supra note 6, §§ I(D), 2.
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APPENDIX A
LLOYD'S AMERICAN TRUST
WHEREAS:
1. THIS INSTRUMENT (hereinafter called "the American
Trust Deed") sets forth certain of the terms and provisions
governing the American business of each Underwriting
Member of the Society of Lloyd's (hereinafter called "the
Name").
2. The parties under the American Trust Deed shall be the
Name, the Agent through which the Name underwrites
(hereinafter called "the Agent"), the Trustee hereunder acting
from time to time (hereinafter called "the American Trustee")
and the Society of Lloyd's (hereinafter called "Lloyd's").
3. The form of the American Trust Deed was originally
adopted on August 26, 1939 and has heretofore been amended
by various instruments dated October 31, 1947, January 14,
1948, October 2, 1963 and September 22, 1982, all such
amendments being made by the Committee, the then
governing body of Lloyd's at the request of the Agent in
accordance with Clause 17 of the American Trust Deed as
heretofore amended.
4. The Agent has requested the Council, the present
governing body of Lloyd's, to exercise its power to vary and
modify the trusts and provisions of the American Trust Deed
in the manner set forth herein and the Council hereby
exercises its said power by special resolution dated 5th April,
1989. The American Trustee has consented to the Council's
exercise of its said power. The American Trust Deed as so
varied and modified shall constitute the American Instrument
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/2
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and shall also constitute an Overseas Direction of the Council
as those terms are defined in the Lloyd's Premiums Trust
Deed approved by one of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal
Secretaries of State under the Insurance Companies Act 1982
for insurance business other than long term business
(hereinafter call "the Lloyd's Premiums Trust Deed").
5. The American Trust Deed as so varied and modified is
hereby restated in its entirety.
NOW, THEREFORE, it has been agreed that the property
held or hereafter received by the American Trustee shall be
subject to the following trusts and provisions:
FIRST: (A) The Name is an Underwriting Member of
Lloyd's and underwrites through the agency of the Agent in
association which certain other Underwriting Members of
Lloyd's (hereinafter called "the other Names").
(B) The American Trust Deed shall relate and
apply to the American business carried on by the Name and
not to any other underwriting business which the Name may
now or hereafter carry on at Lloyd's or elsewhere.
(C) "The American business" means such part of
the Name's underwriting business at Lloyd's (other than long
term business as defined from time to time by the Insurance
Companies Act 1982 or by a later similar statute) as complies
with the following two conditions: (i) the liability of the Name
in respect thereof is expressed in U.S. dollars; and (ii) the
premium payable to or for the account of the Name has been
paid or is payable in U.S. dollars.
(D) Any reference in the American Trust Deed
to "the American Trust Fund" means the property held in trust
hereunder.
(E) Any reference in the American Trust Deed
to "the Council" means the Council of Lloyd's constituted by
Lloyd's Act 1982 and such of the following as shall from time
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to time be authorized by the Council to exercise any power
hereby conferred on the Council; the Committee on Lloyd's the
Chairman of the Committee or a Deputy Chairman of the
Committee, as the case may be.
(F) Any reference in the American Trust Deed to
"the Premiums Trust Fund" means the property held in trust
subject to the provisions of the Lloyd's Premiums Trust Deed.
(G) (i) Any reference in the American Trust
Deed to "the Agent" means the Name's members agent at
Lloyd's and any agent appointed by the members agent in
exercise of any authority given by the Name (or appointed by
any agent or sub-agent of the members agent acting under any
such authority or delegation of such authority) to act as an
agent or sub-agent of the Name for the purpose of conducting
all of any part of the Name's underwriting business any
successor thereto so acting and any Representative designated
as hereinafter in this subdivision (G) provided.
(ii) The Agent may at any time and from
time to time, by one or more instruments in writing filed
which the American Trustee, designate any one or more
employees of the Society (without limitation as to number) as
the Agent's Representative or Representatives, and such
Representative or any of such Representatives may, to the
extent set forth in the relevant designation, act in like manner
and with the same effect as the Agent itself might act
hereunder. The designation of any employee of the Society as
the Agent's Representative as hereinbefore provided shall
remain effective unless and until revoked by the Agent by an
instrument in writing filed with the American Trustee.
SECOND: The trusts hereunder shall subsist from the
date of commencement of the underwriting business of the
Name until such underwriting business shall have been wound
up or until twenty-one years after the date of death of the
Name, whichever shall first occur, which period shall be called
"the trust term".
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THIRD: (A) Principal of the American Trust Fund shall
consist of: (i) all premiums and other moneys payable during
the trust term to or for the account of the Name in connection
with the American business; (ii) all other assets from time to
time transferred to the American Trustee to be held by it as
part of the American Trust Fund; and (iii) all investments and
moneys for the time being representing the same.
(B) (i) All premiums and other moneys
payable to or for the account of the Name during the trust
term in connection with the American business shall be paid
or accounted for to the American Trustee and (by whomsoever
and in whatever names the same may at any time be held)
shall until so paid or accounted for be held on trust so to pay
and account for the same, but the American Trustee need not
inquire whether this provision has been complied with, or
verify the correctness of any account submitted to it, or take
any steps to collect the said premiums or other moneys, and
the American Trustee shall only be responsible for the
amounts actually received by it.
(ii) Because premiums may be received
by the American Trustee before all brokerage and/or
commission and/or discount payable in respect thereof has
been paid, the Council may from time to time make
regulations or give directions regarding the payment of such
brokerage and/or commission and/or discount by the American
Trustee. The American Trustee shall comply with such
regulations and directions, and shall be protected in so doing,
without inquiring whether or not the same are authorized or
appropriate.
FOURTH: Income of the American Trust Fund shall be
paid to the Premiums Trust Fund or transferred to principal
of the American Trust Fund in such amounts as the Agent
may from time to time direct. The American Trustee shall
accept and act upon the statement of the Agent as to what
income is to be paid or transferred in accordance with the
foregoing provisions.
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FIFTH: Principal of the American Trust Fund shall be
held in trust for the following purposes:
(A) To pay any losses, claims, returns of
premiums, re-insurance premiums and other outgoings in
connection with the American business;
(B) To pay the expenses incurred in
connection with the American business, which expenses shall
be deemed to include: (i) remuneration and proper expenses
of the American Trustee; (ii) any salary, commission, or other
remuneration payable to the Agent or any other person, or any
proper expenses of the Agent or any other person, in
connection with the conduct or winding up of the American
business; and (iii) a proper proportion as certified or reported
by auditors approved by the Council of any salary, commission,
or other remuneration payable to the Agent, or any proper
expenses of the Agent, in connection with the conduct or
winding up of any underwriting business of the Name,
whether the American business or not, and any expenses
whatsoever from time to time incurred in connection with any
underwriting business of the Name, whether the American
business or not;
(C) To transfer to the Premiums Trust Fund
annually, if requested by the Agent, such property of the
American Trust Fund as appears from certificates or reports
given by auditors approved by the Council to be in excess of
the amount or amounts required to be held in the American
Trust Fund in accordance with the Instructions for the
Guidance of Auditors issued by the Council from time to time
in force to be held and dealt with as part of the Premiums
Trust Fund.
(D) To transfer to the Premiums Trust Fund
at any other time, if requested by the Agent and approved by
the Council, such property of the American Trust Fund as is
certified or reported by auditors approved by the Council to
exceed the amount required to be held in the American Trust
Fund for the purpose of providing for all liabilities both actual
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and estimated in respect of the American business.
(E) The American Trustee shall accept and act
upon the statement of the Agent as to what sums are from
time to time required to be paid out of the American Trust
Fund, and to whom payable, for any of the purposes specified
in this Article without requiring the accuracy of any such
statement to be verified, provided, however, that such
statement shall be accompanied, where required by this
Article, by a certificate or report of auditors approved by the
Council and, where so required, by written evidence of Council
approval; and provided further that such statement does not
conflict with any regulation or direction of the Council to the
American Trustee pursuant to Article THIRD (B) (ii) hereof.
(F) The American Trustee shall not be
required to inquire as to: (i) the accuracy of any certificate or
report of the said auditors furnished to it under the provisions
of this Article; or (ii) whether such certificate or report has
been prepared in accordance with the instructions and
regulations of the Council; or (iii) the propriety of any approval
by the Council. The American Trustee shall be fully protected
in relying upon any auditors' certificate or report or any
resolution of the Council determining what transfers may be
made to the Premiums Trust Fund under the foregoing
provisions of this Article.
(G) With respect to sums requested by the
Agent to be paid in accordance with this Article, the American
Trustee shall either make payment directly in the amounts
and to the person or persons specified by the Agent, or, in its
discretion, make payment to the Agent to be disbursed by the
Agent in the manner specified. The American Trustee shall
have no duty to see to the application of payments so made to
the Agent, nor shall it be liable for the misapplication of such
payments.
SIXTH: (A) The American Trust Fund shall inure for
the benefit of all policy holders to whom the Name is liable in
respect of the American business. No policy holder shall be
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entitled at any time to charge the American Trustee in respect
of any assets, other than the assets of the American Trust
Fund in the hands of the American Trustee at the time the
policy holder's claim becomes enforceable as herein defined.
Nor even after his claim becomes enforceable as herein
defined, shall any policy holder be entitled to require from the
American Trustee any account, or otherwise to inquire into the
course of administration of the trusts relating to the American
Trust Fund, or to question any act or thing done or suffered by
the American Trustee, or otherwise to enforce such trusts, the
sole right under the American Trust Deed of such policy holder
being to receive the amount of his claim after it has become
enforceable as herein defined from the assets of the American
Trust fund then actually in the hands of the American Trustee
and available for such payment as provided in subdivision (C)
of this Article.
(B) The claim of a policy holder against the
American Trust Fund shall become enforceable within the
meaning of this Article when all of the following four
conditions have been complied with:
(1) A judgment has been
obtained by the policy holder in any court of competent
jurisdiction Within the United States against the Name in
respect of the Name's liability under a policy.
(2) Such judgment has become
final in the sense that the particular litigation has been
concluded either through the failure to appeal within the time
permitted therefor or through the final disposition of any
appeal or appeals that may be taken. The word "appeal" as
used in this subdivision (B) shall include any similar
procedure for review permitted by the applicable law.
(3) The filing with the American
Trustee of a certified copy of the said judgment, together with
such proof as to its finality and its conformance with the other
conditions specified in this subdivision (B) as the American
Trustee shall require.
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(4) The expiration of a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of the said certified
copy of the said judgment and all of the said proofs with the
American Trustee without such judgment having been
satisfied.
(C) Where the claim of any policy holder
becomes enforceable as defined in subdivision (B) of this
Article, the judgment therein referred to shall be forthwith
satisfied by the American Trustee out of the American Trust
Fund without regard to the rights of the other policy holders
to whom the Name is liable in respect of the American
business or any payment that may be then due for any of the
purposes specified under Article FIFTH hereof, other than the
remuneration and expenses of the American Trustee.
(D) The American Trustee shall be absolutely
protected and shall incur no liability for any action taken or
omitted by it in good faith hereunder, and shall be absolutely
protected in relying upon the opinion of counsel in New York
as to whether or not any judgment obtained by a policy holder
conforms with all of the conditions specified in subdivision (B)
of this Article, including, without limitation, whether or not
the court in which such judgment was obtained is a court of
competent jurisdiction within the meaning of the said
subdivision, and whether or not such judgment is final within
the meaning of the said subdivision. In the event of any suit
or proceeding brought against the American Trustee based
upon a judgment obtained by a policy holder against the Name
in respect of the Name's liability under a policy, the American
Trustee shall be entitled to charge against the American Trust
Fund any expenses incurred by it in the said suit, including
attorneys' fees, and also any judgment obtained against the
American Trustee, including interest and costs.
SEVENTH:
(A) Subject to the aforesaid trusts, the
American Trust Fund shall be held in trust during the trust
term for the Name, his executors, administrators and assigns.
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EIGHTH: (A) Subject to the requirements of the Council,
the American Trust Fund shall be managed and invested by
the American Trustee at the direction of the Agent.
(B) (i) The American Trustee shall not be
bound to inquire whether the Agent has complied with the
regulations and directions of the Council with respect to any
investment and, unless otherwise directed by the Agent, shall
be under no duty to take any action with respect to
investments other than to collect the income or other sums
payable thereon.
(ii) The American Trustee shall
withdraw from the American Trust Fund such moneys or other
property as the Agent directs for any of the purposes to which
the American Trust Fund is applicable hereunder.
(iii) Unless the Agent shall otherwise
direct, the American Trust Fund may be commingled with the
American Trust Fund of any of the other Names.
(iv) The American Trustee shall notify
the Agent of conversion or subscription or other rights
accruing on property held in the American Trust fund and of
any default in the payment of principal or interest or the
passing of any dividend or other payment in respect of any
such property. Such notice may be addressed to the Agent in
care of Lloyd's, London.
(v) As and when (but not otherwise)
directed by the Agent in each particular case, the American
Trustee shall exercise, sell or waive all conversion,
subscription, voting and other rights of whatsoever nature
including options and warrants, and grant proxies,
discretionary or otherwise.
(vi) Unless the Agent shall otherwise
direct, the American Trustee may register and hold property
of the American Trust Fund in its own name or in the name of
its nominee, or in an appropriate depository, without adding
[Vol. 16:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/2
COLLATERALIZATION FOR REINSURERS
words descriptive of its fiduciary character.
(C) The Agent may direct that all or any of
the powers conferred on it by this Article of giving directions
relating to the management and investment of the American
Trust Fund shall be delegated to such company or other person
(including any subsidiary, affiliate or associate of the
American Trustee) on such terms and subject to such
conditions, with such remuneration payable out of the
American Trust Fund, as the Agent may think fit and agree
with the company or other person to whom the delegation is to
be made, and the Agent may at any time revoke or agree to
vary any such delegation.
NINTH: Nothing herein contained shall constitute any
partnership between the Name and the Agent or between the
Name and any of the other Names, the underwriting business
of the Name being carried on for this own sole and separate
account.
TENTH: If any difference shall at any time arise between
the American Trustee and the Name or his executors,
administrators or assigns, or between the American Trustee
and the Agent, relating to the Trusts under the American
Trust Deed, or the administration thereof, or anything
connected therewith, or if the American Trustee shall at any
time feel any doubt or difficulty in administering the said
trusts, it shall be an absolute protection to the American
Trustee against all claims and demands whatsoever by the
Name, his executors, administrators and assigns, or by the
Agent, or by any other person (including any policy holder),
that in case of any act or thing already done or omitted by the
American Trustee the Council shall approve of such act or
thing having been so done or omitted, and that in the case of
any act or thing intended to be done or omitted the Council
shall approve of such intended act or omission, and it shall not
be necessary for the Council to give any reason for any such
approval. The foregoing provisions of this Article are only for
the protection of the American Trustee and shall not be
construed to impose any obligation on the American Trustee to
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apply for any such approval of the Council, nor shall the
American Trustee be under any liability for omitting to do so.
ELEVENTH: The American Trustee shall submit to the
Agent, whenever requested by the Agent in writing, an account
in respect of its acts and proceedings as such trustee, but not
oftener than semi-annually (except in the case of the death or
retirement of the Name or in the event of the removal or
resignation of the American Trustee). The approval of any
account of the American Trustee by the Agent shall be binding
and conclusive upon any and all persons interested hereunder,
and shall constitute a complete discharge and acquittance to
the American Trustee with respect to any and all matters
covered by such account, and the American Trustee shall not
thereafter be accountable to any person whomsoever with
respect to its acts and proceedings during the period covered
by such account. The American Trustee shall not be required
to account to any person other than the Agent.
TWELFTH: The Council shall have power in its discretion
to amend the American Trust Deed and also to revoke the
trusts created hereunder; provided that such power shall not
be exercised by the Council unless the Council is satisfied that
all liabilities both actual and estimated of the Name in respect
of the American business have been met or provided for and
shall have so notified the American Trustee; and provided that
any revocation of the trusts hereunder shall not be effective
until five years (or any shorter period that may be permitted
pursuant to the provisions of the New York State insurance
law, or the regulations thereunder) from the date on which the
Council shall notify the American Trustee in writing of the
Council's intention to revoke such trusts; except that the
foregoing provision shall not be deemed to prevent the
replacement of the trusts hereunder with another trust or
trusts meeting the requirements of the New York State
insurance law, or the regulations thereunder; and provided
that notice of the decision to replace the trusts shall be given
to the American Trustee at least one year before such trust or
trusts shall become effective. The Council shall give written
notice to the American Trustee and to the Agent (and the
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Agent shall in turn notify the Name) of any such amendment
or revocation and of the effective date thereof. The American
Trustee shall notify the Superintendent of Insurance of the
State of New York within thirty (30) days of the American
Trustee's receipt of notification that the American Trust Deed
has been amended or the trusts created hereunder have been
revoked, or that such trusts will be replaced.
THIRTEENTH: The American Trustee shall accept written
notice given by the Council as to the identity of the Agent.
The American Trustee shall be protected in acting upon any
written statement made by the Agent with respect to the
authority conferred on it whether directly or indirectly by the
Name.
FOURTEENTH: The Council may make such
arrangements with the American Trustee as the Council and
the American Trustee think fit as to the remuneration of the
American Trustee and any such remuneration shall be an
expense of the American Trust Fund. The American Trustee
shall be entitled to reimbursement out of the American Trust
Fund of any reasonable expenses (including, without limiting
the Generality of the foregoing, counsel fees) incurred by it in
connection with the administration of the American Trust
Fund, and the American Trustee shall have a first lien on the
property from time to time comprising the American Trust
Fund for any such remuneration and the amount of any such
expenses.
FIFTEENTH: Subject to the effective date provisions of
this Article, the American Trustee may at any time be
removed as trustee and a new American Trustee appointed
hereunder by a resolution passed by the Council, provided that
any trustee appointed under this Article shall be a bank or
trust company organized under the laws of the United States
of America or any State thereof and shall be a member of the
Federal Reserve System in the United States of America.
Upon adoption of any such resolution of appointment, an
authorized officer of Lloyd's shall execute such instruments as
are necessary or proper for effectuating the appointment of the
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new American trustee. Upon the appointment of the new
American Trustee, the American Trust Fund shall be
transferred to the new American Trustee. The American
Trustee may resign at any time by giving written notice
addressed to the Chairman of Lloyd's, London. Such removal
or resignation shall take effect on the date specified therein,
which shall not be less than ninety (90) days from the date of
the Council's resolution of removal or the date the resignation
is mailed, as the case may be. On and after the effective date
of such removal or resignation, the sole duty of the former
American Trustee shall be to transfer the American Trust
Fund to the new American Trustee. The former American
Trustee shall, nevertheless, remain entitled to the settlement
of its account and to the payment out of the American Trust
Fund of any compensation due to it up to the time of its
removal or resignation and any expenses or other
disbursements (whether theretofore or thereafter arising) for
which it would be entitled to reimbursement from the
American Trust Fund if it had not been transferred to the new
American Trustee.
SIXTEENTH:
(A) The American Trustee shall be protected
in relying upon the authenticity of any communication from
the Council which purports to be signed by an authorized
officer of Lloyd's.
(B) The American Trustee shall also be fully
protected for any action taken or omitted by it in reliance on
any written instrument of any kind believed by it to be
genuine and purporting to be signed or sent by the proper
person or persons or to have been passed by the proper
authorities.
(C) The American Trustee may require that
any request made by the Agent under this instrument shall be
in writing and filed with the American Trustee at its head
office.
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SEVENTEENTH: The legal estate in property from time
to time constituting the American Trust Fund shall be vested
in the American Trustee, subject only to the execution of the
trusts hereunder, and the only right of the Name, his
executors, administrators and assigns shall be one in
personam against the American Trustee to enforce the
performance of the trusts hereunder, and pursuant thereto to
receive any balance that may be available after the application
of the American Trust Fund for all of the other purposes
specified hereunder.
EIGHTEENTH: The provisions of the American Trust
Deed and the rights of all parties in respect of the American
Trust Fund shall be governed by the laws of the State of New
York.
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